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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1980s, international terrorism was coming of age as it matured
with the marriage of state-sponsored terrorism and religious extremism.
In the 1990s, it was increasingly clear that modem terrorists were successfully
choosing technology to exploit the vulnerabilities of modem societies.'
With citizens providing concentrated targets by tending to live, work,
and travel in close proximity, modem societies are particularly susceptible
to massive attacks and weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).2 This fact
was not lost on perpetrators of terrorism as witnessed by its growing
1. For example, on August 7, 1998, the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania
were bombed. At least 252 people died (including twelve U.S. citizens), and more than
5,000 were injured. The attacks on the U.S. embassies in East Africa were carried out on
U.S. embassies located in the central business district in both cities. Most of the deaths
were collateral damage-pedestrians on the street and passengers in public and private
vehicles out on the street. In 2001, in a coordinated operation whose breadth and
audacity stunned the world, terrorists believed to be part of the Al Qaeda network carried
out the worst terrorist attack in modem times, targeting the symbols of U.S. supremacy
and leaving about 3,000 people dead. The majority of the victims were in the giant Twin
Towers complex, which housed numerous offices and thousands of workers.
2. JESSICA STERN, THE ULTIMATE TERRORISTS 4 (1999).
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3
capabilities and lethalness throughout the Cold War era.
Amidst a background of rising deadliness of terrorists with easy access
to a range of low-tech and high-tech weapons, states (notably Israel and the
U.S.) began to suggest that terrorist acts might be approached from a
conflict management perspective, rather than exclusively from a law
enforcement viewpoint.4  This stance was premised on the notion that
"in order to wage war against terrorism, terrorists must be seen, not as
criminals, but as persons jeopardizing national security."
5 The belief is
that only the use of armed force will result in the degree of decisive
action that will minimize the likelihood that offenders will go unpunished.
Isolating terrorist groups and punishing states supporting terrorism
seemed the urgent (though not new) and primary goal of international
cooperation aimed at pressuring countries to take measures unilaterally
or multilaterally to deprive terrorist groups of mobility, safe havens, and
sources of income.
With the end of the Cold War, the development of terrorism as a
transnational enterprise would soon make it, more than ever, a separate
unit of policy concern not simply for states, but the international
community. Though terrorism has always been high on the international
3. "Between 1970 and 1995, on average each year brought 206 more incidents
and 441 more fatalities." Id. at 6.
4. Greg Travalio & John Altenburg, Terrorism, State Responsibility, and the Use
of Military Force, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 97, 99 (2003).
5. Emanuel Gross, Thwarting Terrorist Acts by Attacking the Perpetrators or
Their Commanders as an Act of Self-Defense: Human Rights versus the State's Duty To
Protect Its Citizens, 15 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 195, 202 (2001); see also Abraham D.
Sofaer, The Sixth Annual Waldemar A. Solf Lecture in International Law: Terrorism, the
Law, and the National Defense, 126 MIL. L. REv. 89, 89-90 (1989).
6. In 1997 the General Assembly adopted the International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res. 164, U.N. GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp. No.
49, at 389, U.N. Doc. A/52/49 (1998), creating a regime of universal jurisdiction over the
unlawful and intentional use of explosives and other lethal devices in, into, or against
various defined public places with intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury, or with
intent to cause extensive destruction of the public place. For background on this
convention, see Alex Obote-Odora, Defining International Terrorism, 6 MuRDOCH U.
ELECTRONIC J. L. June 1999, at 59-72.
7. Ideological and political quagmires laid down fertile ground for a dichotomy
of terrorism to come into being. In the 1960s and 1970s, focus on terrorism mainly
targeted ideologically-motivated individuals and small groups. The international community
increasingly targeted manifestations of individual and small group acts of "terror-violence,"
sidestepping the politically volatile issue of state/insurgent sponsored and orchestrated
"terror-violence." M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Policy-Oriented Inquiry into the Different Forms
and Manifestations of International Terrorism, in LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM: U.S. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS xv (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1988); W.T. Mallison,
agenda, it was the September 11, 2001 attacks (hereinafter "September
11") that brought the issue of terrorism and the international regime on
the use of force into a new, urgent, and sustained debate.
This Article aims to evaluate the international legal perspectives attendant
to U.S. counter-terrorism measures and policy and the attendant strictures
and implications. Part II commences by grappling with the uneasy
relationship that legal and political complexities have foisted on the
UN's ability to address terrorism and the difficult issue of the definition
of terrorism. Within the context of this part, the Article also addresses
the two dominant counter-terrorism paradigms-law enforcement and
conflict management. Part III moves on to evaluate the law enforcement
paradigm which treats terrorism as a crime engaging domestic law
enforcement. This part offers a discussion of the "extradite or prosecute"
mechanism that lies at the heart of multilateral anti-terrorism conventions
and a discussion of the bases of international criminal jurisdiction that
provide a framework for domestic anti-terrorism statutes. It concludes
with an analysis of the practice of apprehension of terrorists in international
space, of which the United States has been a leading proponent, and offers
a discussion of the complex legalities attendant to this controversial
means.
In Part IV, the article tackles the complexities and technicalities of the
conflict management paradigm. It commences by examining the international
legal uncertainties inherent in treating terrorists as combatants. The
analysis moves on to cover the use of both limited lethal military force
in the form of targeted assassinations and large scale military force in the
form of pre-emptive strikes and retaliation. In a bid to highlight the
transformation from the Cold War era to the post Cold War era, this part
focuses on U.S. practice and world reaction both pre- and post-Cold
War. It concludes with an examination of the post-September 11 scenario
and evaluates whether any perceptible changes in law or state practice are
taking place following the military campaigns in Afghanistan (Operation
Enduring Freedom) and Iraq (Operation Freedom Iraq).
II. THE UNITED NATIONS AND TERRORISM: AN ASSYMETRICAL
BALANCING ACT
When the U.N. Charter was drafted in 1945, the right of self-defense
was the only included exception (reserved to state discretion) to the
general prohibition of the use of force. Previously, in addition to self-
Jr. & S.V. Mallison, The Concept of Public Purpose Terror in International Law:
Doctrines and Sanctions to Reduce the Destruction of Human and Material Values, 18
How. L.J. 12 (1973).
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defense, customary international law had accepted reprisal, retaliation,
and retribution as legitimate responses by states whose interests had been
injured.8 Under the U.N. Charter,9 unilateral acts of force not characterized
as self-defense, regardless of motive, were made illegal. Individual or
collective self-defense became the cornerstone relating to use of force.
The volatile Cold War era that ushered in the U.N. era saw to it that
any use of external military force by states was almost always pegged on
the right of self-defense in response to an attack, rather than in its
anticipation. The dangers of a recognition of pre-emptive or anticipatory
self-defense were easily understood.' ° In addition, condemnation by the
international community was almost always certain whenever any
attempts were made to base use of force on any of the earlier acceptable
forms of self-help recognized in customary international law.
The U.N. Charter, while seeming to present a neat and tidy regime on
the use of force, nonetheless reflects the drafters' singular focus on creating
a political system to govern conflicts between states." They did not
contemplate the existence of international terrorists nor "... fully anticipate
the existence, tenacity, and technology of modem day terrorism.,' 2 The
U.N. Charter simply does not directly address the subtler modes in
which terrorists began to operate in the post-World War II period.
Against a background of wars-by-proxy in the Cold War era, fuelled
by divisive bipolar politics, terrorist violence was undergoing transformation
and escalating precipitously. As national liberation movements increasingly
8. Reprisal allows a state to commit an act that is otherwise illegal to counter the
illegal act of another state. Retaliation is the infliction upon the delinquent state of the
same injury that it has caused the victim. Retribution is a criminal law concept, implying
vengeance, which is sometimes used loosely in the international law context as a
synonym for retaliation. See, e.g., Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed
Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (1972); EVELYN S. COLBERT, RETALIATION IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 47 (1948).
9. See U.N. CHARTER, arts. 39-51, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter.
10. Professor Jordan Paust identifies this danger succinctly:
[Ils the responding coercion still a use of force in self-defense against an
armed 'attack'? Is the responding coercion primarily pre-emptive, retaliatory,
or for the purpose of imposing sanctions against a violation of international
law? And if among the latter, are any of these forms of responsive coercion
ever permissible?
Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to International Terrorism: The Use of Force
Abroad, 8 WHITTIER L. REv. 711, 716 (1986).
11. See James P. Rowles, Military Responses to Terrorism: Substantive and Procedural
Constraints in International Law, 81 AM. SOC'Y INT'L. PROC. 287, 310-11 (1987).
12. Mark Baker, Terrorism and the Inherent Right of Self-Defense (A Call to
Amend Article 51 of the United Nations Charter), 10 Hous. J. INT'L L. 25 (1987).
attained their goal of self-determination, terrorism motivated by religious
and ideological motivations took center stage and frequently led to acts
of violence with higher levels of fatalities than the relatively more
targeted incidents of violence perpetrated by many secular liberation
movements. 13 The confluence of terrorists and state sponsorship was
transforming ordinary groups, with otherwise limited capabilities, into
more powerful and menacing opponents-converting them from weak
and financially impoverished groups into formidable, well-endowed terrorist
organizations with an ability to attract recruits and sustain their struggle.'
4
A. The "Flip-Flop" U.N. Response to the Terrrorist Scourge
In response to the massacre of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich
Olympics, the United Nations called for legal suppression by its members
of violent acts of terrorists through ratification of the Convention for the
Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism.'
5
Many nations, primarily the United States and its allies, voted against
this resolution due to its bias toward, and legitimization of, violent
national liberation movements. 6 A primary reason of the U.S. stance,
supported by other major Western powers, was the perception that "[t]he
Arab and Soviet blocs, along with other allies, tried to shield radical
movements, with which they sympathized and supported, from being
classified as terrorists-thereby protecting them from international
condemnation and punishment.' 7 This distinction between terrorists and
revolutionaries was the subject of much disagreement. 18 It was to loom
large over any effort in the volatile Cold War era to establish a definition
13. See supra text accompanying note 7.
14. Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism, MICROSOFT ENCARTA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA
(2004), at http://encarta.msn.com (last visited Feb. 5, 2005).
15. Measures to Prevent International Terrorism Which Endangers or Takes
Innocent Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms and Study of the Underlying
Causes of Those Forms of Terrorism and Acts of Violence Which Lie in Misery,
Frustration, Grievance, and Despair and Which Cause Some People to Sacrifice Human
Lives, Including Their Own, in an Attempt to Effect Radical Changes: Draft Convention
for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism, G.A. Res.
U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 27th Sess., Agenda Item 92, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.850 (1972)
[hereinafter Draft Terrorism Convention]. For a brief discussion see Geoffrey M. Levitt,
The International Legal Response to Terrorism: A Reevaluation, 60 U. COLO. L. REv.
533, 537 (1989).
16. Id.
17. Douglas Kash, Abductions of Terrorists In International Airspace and on the
High Seas, 8 FL. J. INT'L L. 65, 75-76 (1993).
18. For example, when Nelson Mandela first visited the U.S., he was on the State
Department's list of international terrorists. Mandela is now a Nobel Peace Prize Laureate
and pre-eminent international statesman. In the Middle East, another "international
terrorist," Yasir Arafat, won the Nobel Peace Prize.
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of terrorism at the international level.' 9
In 1974, the United Nations was presented with its greatest opportunity
to bring terrorism within the ambit of the U.N. Charter through the key
U.N. General Assembly Resolution defining "aggression"--Resolution
3314.2o Sidestepping the volatile issue, the United Nations elected to ignore
using the word "terrorism," choosing instead to classify the activities of
states who send, organize, or support "armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another
State. .. ,,2 1 as unlawful aggression in direct violation of the U.N. Charter.
After another round of ideological and political tussles, in December
1979, real, substantive progress was made by the Sixth Committee
(Legal) of the General Assembly, which recommended condemning
terrorism per se.2 2 Under the draft, "all acts of terrorism that endangered
human lives or fundamental freedoms were unequivocally condemned"
and an appeal was extended for all nations to become party to international
conventions already in existence.23 The resolution, in sum and substance,
was later adopted by the United Nations.24
The important move by the international community in 1979 however
did not mark a practical turning point. Previous ideological and political
differences continued to present a major stumbling block to repeated
attempts by the United Nations in the 1980s to define the term "terrorism.
', 25
These efforts, like those before, failed mainly due to differences of
19. Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, War on the Enemy: Self-Defense and State-Sponsored
Terrorism, 4 MELB. J. INT'L L. 406, 410 (2003).
20. Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess.,
2319th plen mtg., Annex, Supp. No. 31, at art. 3142, U.N. Doc. A/Res/3314 (XXIX) (1974).
21. Id. at art 3(g).
22. Draft Terrorism Convention, supra note 15; International Convention Against
the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 146, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., 105th plen. mtg., at
245, U.N. Doc. A/34/786 (1979).
23. Id.
24. G.A. Res. 34/145, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Agenda Item 112, Supp. No. 46, at
244, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/145 (1979).
25. In choosing to avoid defining terrorism conclusively, the U.N. has either used
it in a more general sense or selected specific acts as constituting terrorist activity.
Consequently, the international community has taken a piecemeal approach and addressed
the problem of international terrorism by identifying particular criminal acts inherently
"terrorist" in nature to be prevented and punished by domestic law. The result has been
the adoption of numerous global treaties, regional conventions, and bilateral agreements,
which are relevant to the suppression of international terrorism, and corresponding
domestic laws that implement those arrangements. See Leah M. Campbell, Defending
Against Terrorism: A Legal Analysis of the Decision to Strike Sudan and Afghanistan, 74
TuE. L. REv. 1067, 1071-72 (2000).
opinion between various states about the use of violence in the context of
conflicts over national liberation and self-determination.
In spite of its failure to define terrorism, the U.N. General Assembly
adopted Resolution 40/61 in 1985, which condemned and criminalized
all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism by whoever and wherever
committed.26 This was a landmark resolution considering that previously,
the international community had taken a piecemeal approach in addressing
the problem of terrorism by identifying particular criminal acts as inherently
terrorist in nature, to be prevented and punished by domestic law.
Language similar to that used in Resolution 40/61 was subsequently
mirrored in a range of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions
dealing with terrorism. Many of these resolutions state that terrorism is
contrary to the purposes and the principles of the United Nations and
represents a threat to international peace and security.27 The fundamental
problem, however, lies in the distinction between unlawful and lawful
force. This is especially problematic in light of the fact that the United
Nations, in choosing to avoid defining terrorism conclusively, has either
used the term in a more general sense or selected specific acts as
constituting terrorist activity.28
To date, efforts by the United Nations to draft a single broad definition
of terrorism acceptable to all states, such as that found in the first ever
penal instrument making terrorism an international offense-the League
of Nations' Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
Terrorism-have failed.29 Conventional international law on terrorism is
presently limited to a relatively small number of widely accepted
conventions that proscribe particular types of terrorism, which reflect
26. G.A. Res. 40/61, 40th Sess., 108th plen. mtg., 1, 6, U.N. Doc A/RES/40/61
(1985).
27. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 31/102, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., 99th plen. mtg., U.N.
Doc. A/RES/31/102 (1976); G.A. Res. 34/145, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., 105th plen.
mtg., 13, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/145 (1979); G.A. Res. 38/130, U.N. GAOR, 38th Sess.,
101st mtg., U.N. Doe. A/RES/38/130 (1983); G.A. Res. 44/29, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
72nd plen. mtg., 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/29 (1989); G.A. Res. 46/51, U.N. GAOR,
46th Sess., 67th plen. mtg., 6, U.N. Doc. A/Res/46/51 (1991); G.A. Res. 51/210, U.N.
GAOR, 51st Sess., 88th plen. mtg., 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/210 (1996); G.A. Res.
53/108, U.N. GAOR, 53rd Sess., 83rd plen. mtg., Agenda Item 155, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/53/108 (1999); G.A. Res. 56/160, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 88th plen. mtg.,
Agenda Item 119b, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/160 (2001) [collectively hereinafter General
Assembly Resolutions].
28. "The international conventions by and large address the form or target of the
terrorist attack, rather than the terrorists themselves." Campbell, supra note 25, at 1071-
72; see also Jeffrey F. Addicott, Legal and Policy Implications for a New Era: The "War
on Terror," 4 SCHOLAR 209, 213-14 (2002).
29. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism, Nov. 16, 1937,
19 League of Nations Official Journal 23 (never entered into force).
[VOL. 6: 243, 2005] Countering Terrorism
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
customary norms of international law.3°
Some basic features that might contribute to an acceptable and
working definition can be gleaned from the following definitions by
various U.S. departments that encapsulate the basic aspects of terrorism:
" [T]he unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence by a
revolutionary organization against individuals or property with
the intention of coercing or intimidating governments or
societies, often for political or ideological purposes.
3 1
" [T]he unlawful use of force or violence against persons or
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political
or social objectives.32
" [P]remeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against
non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine
agents.33
" [V]iolent criminal conduct apparently intended: (1) to intimidate
or coerce a civilian population; (2) to influence the conduct of
a government by intimidation or coercion; or (3) to affect the
conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping.34
The synthesis of these definitions is broadly consistent with most
definitions in academic literature, which generally require two elements:
actual or threatened violence against civilians or persons not actively
taking part in hostilities and the implicit or explicit purpose of using the
act to intimidate or compel a population, government, or organization
into some course of action.35
30. The most common types of terrorism covered by these conventions include
crimes against the safety of civil aviation and maritime navigation, the taking of
hostages, the use of nuclear and chemical weapons, and crimes against internationally-
protected persons. See Yonah Alexander, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century: Threats
and Responses, 12 DEPAuL Bus. L. J. 59, 92-94 (1999); Louis Rene Beres, On International
Law and Nuclear Terrorism, 24 GA.. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 3 n.6 (1994).
31. Alex P. Semid & Albert Jongman, A Selection of Recent Governmental and
Academic Definitions, 8, at www.utcc.ac.thlamsar/about/document7.html.
32. Id. 3; 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) (2005).
33. Semid & Jongman, supra note 31, 9; 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (West 2005).
34. Id. 4.
35. See, e.g., HARRY HENDERSON, GLOBAL TERRORISM: THE COMPLETE REFERENCE
GUIDE 1-30 (2001); DAVID E. LONG, THE ANATOMY OF TERRORISM 1-13 (1990); Ken
Booth & Tim Dunne, Preface to WORLDS IN COLLISION: TERROR AND THE FUTURE OF
GLOBAL ORDER 1 (Ken Booth & Tim Dunne eds., 2002). These basic elements are supported
by a proposed convention drafted by the International Law Association, which defines an
B. Counter-Terrorism Management Paradigms
The international confusion over a precise definition of terrorism and
its collorary, State-sponsored terrorism, has hampered any effective
development in the discourse regarding acceptable counter-terrorism
measures. General agreement by states at a philosophical level on what
constitutes terrorism masks serious disagreements in practice.
Disagreements amongst states are not surprising in light of the fact
that many factors contribute to the utility of terrorism not only by
independent terrorist groups but also by some states. In its simplest terms,
terrorism as a weapon has proven to be cheap and to have a synergistic
effect in its impact. Like other forms of low-intensity warfare, terrorism
is asymmetric warfare that breaks battlefield linearity by seeking and
exploiting a combination of "spaces and timing" by avoiding a target
State's strengths and attacking its vulnerabilities.36 Additionally, terrorism's
effectiveness is increased by the very fact that it throws its victims off
balance, forcing them to grope for an appropriate means of response.
States have historically initiated a legal response as their first reaction
to international terrorist activities. From the legal perspective, managing
the terrorist threat requires identification of the threat and a selection
from the range of counter terrorism measures usually within the framework
of international conventions that generally provide for domestic
prosecution. Legal means to combat terrorism, however, often prove to
be insufficient mechanisms for deterring future terrorist attacks.37 As a
consequence, states have sought to wean themselves from a sole reliance
on this paradigm. States have worked in earnest to develop new strategies
within the rubric of international law to deal with terrorism by seeking to
co-opt use of military force as a countermeasure against terrorism. Two
general paradigms of counter-terrorism management have developed: 1) law
international terrorist offence as:
[A]ny serious act of violence or threat thereof by an individual whether acting
alone or in association with other persons, organizations, places, transportation
or communications systems or against members of the general public for the
purpose of intimidating such persons, causing injury to or the death of such
persons, disrupting the activities of such international organizations, of causing
loss, detriment or damage to such places or property, or of interfering with
such transportation and communications systems in order to undermine
friendly relations among States or among the nationals of different States or to
extort concessions from States.
INT'L LAw AsS'N, REPORT OF THE FaFTY-Nnrm CoNFERENcE 497-504 (1982) (emphasis added).
36. Marcus Corbin, Reshaping the Military for Asymmetric Warfare (2001), at
http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfmdocumentlD=218 (last visited Feb.
5, 2005).
37. Tyler Raimo, Winning at the Expense of Law: The Ramifications of Expanding
Counter-Terrorism Law Enforcement Jurisdiction Overseas, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
1473, 1478 (1999).
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enforcement-which' is based on the concept of terrorists as primarily
criminals and 2) conflict management-which treats terrorists as threats
to national security. The Article turns now to consider these paradigms.
1. The Law Enforcement Paradigm
The United States has historically initiated a legal response as their
first reaction to international terrorist activities.
38  Legal mechanisms
such as extradition and prosecution are primary examples of legal
responses used by states against international terrorists.
39
Until recently, the law enforcement approach predominated counter-
terrorism responses.40 This approach considers terrorist events as purely
criminal acts to be addressed by the domestic criminal justice system.
4'
This entails domestic criminal law which is clearly within the authority
of individual nations and grants no status-other than that of common
criminal and common crime-to either those who commit terrorist acts
or to the acts themselves. A law enforcement response triggers checks
and balances of the criminal justice system, allowing for courts of law to
uphold individual civil liberties by ensuring due process.
42
Under this paradigm, managing the terrorist threat requires identification
of the threat and a selection from the range of counter terrorism
measures usually within the framework of international anti-terrorist
conventions. These conventions generally provide for prosecution through
the aut dedere, aut judicare-extradite and prosecute-mechanism.
Despite the clear-cut positives that the domestic legal enforcement
framework offers, it has proved to be inadequate. The possibility of
dismissed charges or acquitted defendants is all too real and frequent.
43
The absence of an effective international police agency and the reality
38. See, e.g., id.
39. See, e.g., Omnibus Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
399, 100 Stat. 855 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.) (providing a
basis for the United States to prosecute terrorists for acts committed against Americans
overseas); see also Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Role of the United States in the
International Enforcement of Criminal Law, 31 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 37, 64-71 (1990)
(noting the United States' efforts to renegotiate extradition treaties in order to prosecute
international terrorists).
40. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-
Oriented Assessment, 43 HARV. INT'L. L. J. 83, 88-96 (2002).
41. See, e.g., Raimo supra note 37, at 1476; Sofaer, supra note 5, at 89-90;
Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 4, at 99.
42. Id.
43. Id.
that the police in some states may be corrupt and/or ineffective or a state
is willing to harbor terrorists renders this approach good in theory, but
hopeless in practice. 4
2. The Conflict Management Paradigm
States have never relied solely on the law enforcement paradigm to
combat terrorism because legal strategies often prove to be insufficient
mechanisms for deterring future attacks.45 In the face of the seriousness
of new and potentially devastating terrorist threats, there seems an
urgent need to take action before an attack occurs rather than respond to
an attack with legal action.46
The perceived threat that terrorism poses to states has had a great
impact on the policies used to thwart it, leading some states, particularly
the United States and Israel, to seek to co-opt military force.4 7 This
move has been accelerated by the proliferation of transnational terrorist
groups with global reach. Terrorists now use more sophisticated and
48devastating weapons, seeking targets that inflict the greatest damage on
human life and property.49 They "now look to multi-millionaires and
entire nations for financial support."50 With large "war chests," terrorists
have steadily developed their capabilities with a lethal combination of
professionalism and advanced weaponry.
44. Id.
45. Raimo, supra note 37, at 1478.
46. See 143 CONG. REC. H652 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1997) (describing law enforcement
proactive measures as "prevention, immediate incident response, and post-incident
response").
47. See Combating Terrorism: The Proliferation of Agencies' Efforts: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on National Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice of
the House Comm. Gov't Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong. 15 (1998), available athttp://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=105_house hearings&
docid=f:50803.pdf [hereinafter Agencies' Efforts To Fight Terrorism] (statement of
Richard Davis, Director of National Security Analysis, National Security and International
Affairs Division) (asserting that, since the 1970s, the United States' policy towardterrorism abroad has evolved concurrently with the perception and nature of the terrorist
threat).
48. See U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 105th Cong. 1 (1998) [hereinafter Counter-terrorism Policy Hearings] (statement
of Louis J. Freeh, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation) (announcing that the trendof international terrorism is to inflict the maximum amount of destruction to property
and human life and create a sense of terror to gain media recognition).
49. See Tim Weiner, Man with Mission Takes on the U.S. at Far-Flung Sights,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1998, at Al (noting that Osama bin Laden, president of "Terrorist
University," provides major assistance to terrorist organizations and Islamic groups from
his $250 million fortune).
50. Raimo, supra note 37, at 1479.
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The advanced weapons available to terrorists pose an alarming national security
threat, providing terrorists with the ability to destabilize entire regions... and
to inflict massive harm against ... citizens and property. 51
In view of the reality and threat posed by international terrorism, in
the 1980s Israel and the United States began to suggest that terrorist acts
might be approached from a conflict management paradigm, engaging
the use of both lethal and non-lethal military force rather than exclusively
from a law enforcement viewpoint. This was premised on the fact that
the legal means available for confronting terrorism did not conform to
the new nature of the international terrorism threat. Legal strategy,
especially in a climate of state-sponsored terrorism, simply failed to
deter international terrorists from acting and equally failed to discourage
"rogue states" from availing safe havens and support.52
The growing belief was that only the use of armed force would result
in the degree of decisive action that would minimize the likelihood that
offenders would go unpunished or be free to plan attacks.
53 In the face
of the Security Council's inability to control the spread of international
terrorism or deal with it effectively, Israel and the United States sought
to circumvent, or stretch, the provisions of the U.N. Charter, arguing that
they would legitimately use military force to counter terrorism. This
was based on the reality that the reach and capabilities of some terrorist
groups had transformed the landscape. Terrorists were now not simply
criminals, but persons jeopardizing national security.54
III. LAW ENFORCEMENT PARADIGM: TERRORISM AS A CRIME
A. Anti-Terrorism Conventions: The Extradite or
Prosecute Mechanism
Classifying international terrorism as a crime creates a dilemma
because a "criminal act of terrorism to some will embody a legitimate
act of self-determination to others., 55 At times, states have not strictly
51. Id. at 1480.
52. See Neil C. Livingston, Proactive Responses to Terrorism: Reprisals, Preemption,
and Retribution, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: CHARACTERISTICS, CAUSES, CONTROLS
219, 219-20 (Charles W. Kegley, Jr. ed., 1990) (commenting on the different
interpretations of international terrorism).
53. Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 4, at 99.
54. Gross, supra note 5, at 202; see also Sofaer, supra note 5, at 89-90.
55. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Introduction to INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 12 (Charles
W. Kegley, Jr. ed., 1990) (quoting Christopher C. Joyner); see also BRIAN M. JENKINS,
applied the definition of international terrorism to foreign acts. Some
acts are often recognized as legitimate actions of groups seeking self-
determination. This method of defining terrorism is based on a political
standard that leaves policymakers the discretion to decide which violent
acts are acceptable and allows for the subjective definition of some
56terrorist groups as revolutionaries.
In view of the difficulty in devising a single definition of terrorism
that appeals to all nations, a piecemeal approach to combating terrorism
was chosen by the international community. It entailed targeting very
specific acts of terrorism, occurring in specific situations, circumstances,r 57 ..
or places. Contemporary multilateral antiterrorist conventions began to
enter the world scene in 1963.58 The overarching enforcement mechanism
of each of these conventions is the requirement that states either extradite
or prosecute the offenders. 59
This pervasive "extradite or prosecute" scheme indicates that the
purpose of the multilateral antiterrorist conventions is to punish and
deter private actors rather than agents of states. This mechanism requires
states to investigate and prosecute serious offenses. The state is given
one of two choices once it obtains custody of the offenders. It may
simply extradite an alleged offender, or, if a custodial state declines to
extradite an alleged offender, it is required, without exception and whether
or not the offense was committed in its territory, to submit the case to its
competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. The effort at the
international level to criminalize terrorism and establish the "extradite or
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: THE OTHER WORLD WAR (stating that the problem of defining
international terrorism has led to the clich6 that "one man's terrorist is another man's
freedom fighter"). Id. at 29.
56. Raimo, supra note 37, at 1482-83.
57. See Kash, supra note 17, at 73.
58. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft,
opened for signature Sept. 14, 1963, art. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter
Tokyo Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft,
opened for signature Dec. 16, 1970, art. 1, T.I.A.S No. 7192, 860 U.N.T.S. 105
[hereinafter Hague Convention]; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, opened for signature Sept. 23, 1971, art. 1, T.I.A.S.
No. 7570, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Montreal Convention]; Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, art. 2, S. TREATY Doc. No. 19, 27 I.L.M. 627; Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
Including Diplomatic Agents, opened for signature Dec. 14, 1973, art. 1, T.I.A.S. No.
8532, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167; Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated
Personnel, G.A. Res. 59, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess, 84th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/49/59
(1994); Convention to Prevent and Punish Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes
Against Persons and Related Extortion that are of International Significance, opened for
signature Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949, 10 I.L.M. 255 [collectively hereinafter Geneva
Conventions].
59. Id.
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prosecute" regime as the primary mechanism for law enforcement is also
reflected in regional initiatives.
60
In an important development, in December 1985, the U.N. General
Assembly adopted Resolution 40/61 which "unequivocally condemned,
as criminal, all acts, methods and practices of terrorism whenever and by
whomever committed., 61 The significance of this resolution lay in the
fact that after thousands of terrorist orchestrated injuries and deaths,
affecting nations across the world, the United Nations had moved to take
away the "shield of legitimacy" behind which terrorists hid.6
2 The world
had officially accepted terrorism, not as an expression of political
ideologies, but as a crime63-"[t]he acts which fell previously through
the cracks of the multiple definitions were not to be specified, but
labeled criminal as a whole." 64
B. Bases of Extra-Territorial Criminal Jurisdiction
The international anti-terrorism treaties mentioned above prohibiting
various acts of terrorism specify the obligation of states to extradite or
prosecute perpetrators of acts defined as crimes under international law.
In a bid to strengthen domestic capacity to implement the treaties, the
traditional nationality and territorial link that facilitates the operation of
domestic criminal jurisdiction is supplemented by three additional bases
that seek to grant states extra-territorial jurisdiction in recognition of the
extra-territorial nature of many terrorist acts. These are: the protective
principle, the passive personality principle, and the universality principle.65
60. The 1971 Organization of American States' Convention to Prevent and Punish
the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Forms of Crimes Against Persons and Related
Extortion That Are of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, art. 1, 27 U.S.T. 3949,
O.A.S.T.S. 37, developed a class of crimes known as "common crimes of international
significance" which encompass: kidnapping, murder, or other assaults against the life or
personal integrity of, or extortion related to such crimes against, "those persons to whom
the state has the duty to give special protection according to international law." Id. The
Convention provided in Article 5 that, if the state refuses to extradite the offender, the
state must prosecute domestically "as if the act had been committed in its territory." Id.
at art. 5.
61. G.A. Res. 40/61, supra note 26, at 301.
62. Kash, supra note 17, at 76.
63. Although the exact crimes to be considered terrorist acts were not designated,
previously accepted conventions already provided some answers to that question. See
supra note 58 for a list of these conventions.
64. Kash, supra note 17, at 76.
65. See Christopher L. Blakesley, Jurisdictional Issues and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, in
LEGAL RESPONSES TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, supra note 7, at 131, 139-40 (defining
These bases are important in not only facilitating the enforcement of
international treaties, but also the passage of domestic legislation to
implement and/or complement transnational treaty obligations. The Article
will now turn to consider these.
1. The Protective Principle
The protective principle provides jurisdiction on the basis of a perceived
threat to national security, integrity, or sovereignty66 by an extraterritorial
offense.67 The protective principle permits a state to punish a limited
class of crimes (excluding such offenses as violating laws against
political expression) committed outside its territory by persons who are
not its nationals: offenses directed against the security of the state or
other offenses threatening the integrity of governmental functions that
are generally recognized as crimes by developed legal systems.68 The
focus of the protective principle is the nature of the interest that may be
injured, rather than the place of the harm or conduct. 69 Therefore, the
conduct need only be a potential threat to the asserting state's interests or
citizens.70
The United States has passed several laws based on this principle. The
discussion of the full range of legislative measures is beyond the scope
of this Article. One legislation in this context is worth mentioning-the
Omnibus Diplomatic Security Act in 198571 passed by the U.S. Congress.
Its legislative history reveals that the drafters borrowed from some of the
language in the protective principle.72 Congress allowed "an expansive
reading of the principle which enables the U.S. and other nations to
assert jurisdiction over essentially all attacks against its citizens and
the universality principle, the protective principle, and the passive personality principle).
66. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1430 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "sovereignty" as
"[t]he supreme dominion, authority, or rule; [t]he supreme political authority of an
independent state[; tihe state itself").
67. See Blakesley, supra note 65, at 164-72 (defining and applying the protective
principle to international terrorism).
68. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 402 cmt. f
(1987) [hereinafter FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT].
69. Christopher L. Blakesley, Jurisdiction as Legal Protection against Terrorism,
19 CONN. L. REv. 895, 932-33 (1987).
70. Id. at 933.
71. 132 CONG. REc. S1,382-88 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986). The Act established the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security within the State Department and called upon the
Secretary of State to take all necessary actions to ensure the security of the United States
in view of the vulnerability of U.S. facilities and U.S. nationals abroad.
72. For a concise discussion, see Kash, supra note 17, at 80, who notes that Congress
realized that one-half of the terrorist incidents in the previous seventeen years were
aimed at U.S. interests and citizens. Congress therefore sought to address "the protection
of its citizens, the ability to maintain foreign policy, interstate and foreign commerce,
and business travel and tourism."
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interests even though there is no effect occurring within the territory of
the forum state."73
2. The Passive Personality Principle
The passive personality principle allows the extension of jurisdiction
over offenders who victimize citizens of the particular nation seeking
jurisdiction.74 It permits a state to apply its laws to an act committed
outside its territory by aperson who is not its citizen when the victim of
the act was its national.
This principle has been increasingly accepted worldwide as it is applied to
terrorist and other organized attacks on a state's nationals by reason of their
nationality, or to assassination of a state's diplomatic representative or otherofficials. 16
The case of United States v. Benitez77 was one of the first to utilize the
passive personality principle against a terrorist. The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the passive personality
principle could be used to establish jurisdiction in a case against a
terrorist, not a U.S. citizen, who had robbed, assaulted, and conspired to
murder U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents in Columbia.
78
3. The Universality Principle
The most broadly worded jurisdictional base is the universality
principle. It is premised on the notion that acts of terrorism are crimes
against humanity and thus allow a state to prosecute an offender on
behalf of the world.79  This principle permits a state to define and
73. Id. at 80.
74. See Blakesley, supra note 65, at 172-78.
75. FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 68, § 402 cmt. g.
76. Kash, supra note 17, at 81; FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 68,
§ 402 cmt. g.
77. United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S.
1137 (1985). The principle was also at play in United States v. Yunis, 924 F. 2d 1086
(D.C. Cir. 1991), wherein the court applied the passive personality principle codified in
the Hostage Taking Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (West 1984). The United States was able to
assert jurisdiction as two of the passengers on the hijacked Royal Jordanian Airlines
plane were U.S. citizens; thus the United States could prosecute Yunis, who led the
Lebanon's Amal Militia in the hijacking, because "the offender or the person seized or
detained (was) a national of the U.S." Id.
78. Benitez, 741 F.2d at 1316.
79. See Blakesley, supra note 65, at 139-40.
prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the communityof nations as of universal concern, such as piracy or hijackings, wherethere is no connection between the territory and the offense or thenationality of the persons involved.80 Therefore, the location of theterrorist act is irrelevant, as are the nationalities of both the offender andoffended. The crimes encompassed by this principle are considered sobrutal and heinous that any state within the community of nations mayprosecute the accused.8'Whether or not the universality principle applies to "treaty crimes"which predominantly include terrorist related offenses encapsulated ininternational and domestic laws remains a subject of great debate and,not infrequently, controversy. Domestic jurisprudence generally shiesaway from recognizing universal jurisdiction as establishing the basis forprosecuting overseas terrorist crimes. Thus, in 1984, in Tel-Oren v. LibyanArab Republic, the United States Court of Appeals for the District ofColumbia ruled that terrorism did not constitute a violation of the law ofnations.
82
C. Use of Non-Lethal Force: Apprehension of
Terrorists in International Space
Even though most states have voluntarily undertaken to prosecute orextradite persons for the most common terrorist crimes such as air piracyand sabotage, "[w]hen States violate these obligations, and especially whenthey are implicated in the conduct of the terrorists involved, other Statesare seriously affected. ,8 3 A state which directs agents or allied entities
80. FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT supra note 68, § 404. "Like the pirate ofyore, the terrorist is imagined to be the enemy of all (civilized) mankind and thereforesubject to capture by any state and subject to every state's jurisdiction." See Travalio &Altenburg, supra note 4, at 105-06.81. Universal jurisdiction allows any nation to prosecute offenders for certaincrimes even when the prosecuting nation lacks a traditional nexus with the crime, thealleged offender, or the victim. Courts developed this doctrine centuries ago to addresspiracy and later extended it to cover slave trading. The pirate and slave trader weredeemed hostis generis humanis-the enemy of all people. The history of crimes, treaties,and conventions to combat terrorism, and domestic laws of all nations, "when consideredas a whole, make it clear that terrorism-including hostage taking or kidnapping orwanton acts of violence against innocent civilians-is really a composite term includingall of the separately universally condemned offenses, and thus triggers the universalitytheory ofjurisdiction." Blakesley, supra note 65, at 915.82. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 795 (D.C. Cir 1984), cert.denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). While just one example, Tel-Oren carries the generaltenor of domestic jurisprudence that acknowledges terrorism is an activity that attractsinternational condemnation, but nonetheless permits them to be viewed as eitherlegitimate means of political protest or labeled as a criminal offense. See also Blakesley,supra note 69, at 795-96.
83. Sofaer, supra note 5, at 106-07.
260
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to attack diplomats abroad or to take hostages within its own borders
obviously will not order the extradition or prosecution of these perpetrators.
8 4
Often, the sad reality is that some nations of the world refuse to condemn
terrorism and/or condone it.
[T]he impact of political considerations in the extradition process, and the
various degrees of assistance and support some nations provide to terrorist
groups, make it virtually impossible to gain custody of terrorists using
traditional methods.
85
As a result, barring extraordinary intervention, perpetrators can escape
criminal sanctions for the conduct proscribed in multilateral antiterrorist
conventions as well as under domestic legislation. Nations victimized
by terrorists are thus left with no choice but to occasionally assert
themselves forcefully in order to apprehend terrorists and bring them to
the abducting state for prosecution.
An abduction is the forcible, unconsented removal of a person by
agents of one state from the territory of another state. Professor M. Cherif
Bassiouni's assertion that international abductions violate international
law by disrupting world order and infringing upon sovereignty and
territorial integrity of other states is illustrative of customary international
law.86 This is in light of the fact that sovereignty is one of the most
fundamental attributes of international law. Under international law, the
government of one country cannot conduct activities in the territory of
another country unless acting with the consent of that nation.87
84. A similar situation occurred during the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979, when
militant students, with the acquiescence of the Iranian government, seized the U.S.
Embassy and forty-three hostages in Tehran. The International Court of Justice held that
the seizure violated two treaties on consular relations, but did not refer to the Hostage
Convention. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3 (May 24).
85. Id. at 85; D. Cameron Findlay, Abducting Terrorists Overseas for Trial in the
United States: Issues of International and Domestic Law, 23 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 1, 50 (1988).
86. M. CherifBassiouni, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
124 (1974). Cf Andrew Wolfenson, The U.S. Courts and the Treatment of Suspects
Abducted Abroad under International Law, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 705, 707 (1989-90)
(asserting that this is customary law, which is subject to change and modification by
continued practice within the international community). Kash argues that abductions
have a degree of acceptance under international law. Kash, supra note 17, at 82. The
author disagrees with the assertion. Recognition of a given fact is one thing; acceptance
is another.
87. See FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 68, § 432 cmt. b (explaining
the infringement of sovereignty).
1. "James Bond" Style Operations
a. "Operation Golden Rod"
On June 11, 1985, Fawaz Yunis and four other terrorists boarded
Royal Jordanian Airlines Flight 402 armed with hand grenades and
automatic weapons. While the plane was on the ground in Beirut,
Lebanon,88 Yunis took control of the cockpit and forced the pilot to take-
off.89 The others tied up Jordanian air marshals and held the passengers
hostage, including two American citizens.90 Subsequently, an American
investigation led to Yunis, and "Operation Goldenrod" was put into
effect. Undercover FBI agents lured Yunis onto a yacht in the eastern
Mediterranean Sea with promises of a drug deal.92 He was arrested and
transferred to a U.S. Navy ship where he was interrogated for several
days.93 After arriving in Washington, D.C., Yunis was arraigned on charges
of conspiracy, hostage taking, and aircraft damage.94
Commenting on the international legal duty of states to prosecute or
extradite hijackers, such as in the case of Yunis, District Judge Barrington
Parker observed that nations cannot be permitted to seize terrorists
anywhere in the world in an unregulated manner. Governments must act
in accordance with international law and domestic statutes. He
noted, however, that where a state such as Lebanon, is "incapable or
unwilling... [to] enforce its obligations under the [Montreal] Convention,"
or when a government "harbors international terrorists or is unable to
enforce international law, it is left to the world community to respond
and prosecute the alleged terrorists.
95
b. The Achille Lauro Incident
On October 7, 1985, Palestinian terrorists hijacked the Italian Cruise
Ship Achille Lauro while it was sailing the Mediterranean Sea with more
than four hundred people on board.9  It was announced the following






94. Id. A grand jury added additional aircraft damage counts and a charge of air
piracy. Under the Hostage Taking Act, supra note 77, since two of the passengers were
U.S. citizens, the United States was able to assert jurisdiction as "the offender or the
person seized or detained (was) a national of the U.S." The court permitted the United
States to assert jurisdiction by relying on the universal and passive personality principles
of international law jurisdiction.
95. U.S. v. Yunis, 681 F.Supp. 896, 906-07 (D.C. Dist. 1988).
96. John Tagliabue, Hijackers of Ship Vow Again to Kill 400 Held Hostage, N.Y.
TiMES, Oct. 9, 1985, at Al.
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day that the terrorists who had commandeered the ship were members of
the Palestine Liberation Front. The hijacking lasted two days, during
which time a disabled American was murdered and thrown overboard. 9
The hijackers surrendered to a representative of the Palestine Liberation
Organization and were guaranteed safe conduct out of Egypt to an
undisclosed location.98 As the terrorists were being flown out of Egypt
in an Egyptian airliner with Egyptian security men aboard, American
naval forces intercepted the plane and forced it to land in Italy at a joint
Italian-NATO airbase.99 It was immediately surrounded by American
commandos. The commandos, in turn, were surrounded by Italian soldiers. 00
After a tense standoff between U.S. and Italian forces, the Italians seized
the hijackers along with Abbas and took them into custody pursuant to
an agreement reached by the American and Italian governments.
Reacting to this incident, international law expert Andreas Lowenfeld
asserted: "[W]e did not violate anybody's air space, we didn't hurt anybody,
and so I think we didn't violate international law." 10 1 While intercepting
an Egyptian airliner might in itself be a violation of international law,
the breach of international law by Egypt in not taking the terrorists into
custody and either extraditing or prosecuting them, according to
Lowenfeld, prompted America's justifiable response to a "worse breach"
by Egypt.
102
The author concludes by noting that seizures of suspected terrorists
overseas arguably constitutes a serious breach of the territorial sovereignty
97. Judith Miller, Hyackers Yield Ship in Egypt, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al.
98. Id.
99. Bernard Gwertzman, Reverberations: The U.S. May Pay a High Price for Its
Triumph, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1985, at D1.
100. The Italians brought criminal charges against the terrorists, but refused
American requests to hold Abbas for investigation due to lack of evidence. The day after
American arrest warrants were issued for Abbas and the four hijackers, Abbas was
allowed to leave Italy aboard a Yugoslavian jet. For details of the enfolding drama, see
generally Ross Laver, Striking Back, MACLEAN'S, Oct. 21, 1985, at 32, 36; Jill Smolowe,
Piecing Together the Drama, TIME, Oct. 28, 1985, at 31; John Tagliabue, Italians
Attempt to Reassure US., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1985, at Al; Loren Jenkins, PLO Leader
Slips from US. Grasp in Italy, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1985, at Al.
101. Stuart Taylor, Jr., Plane Diversion Raises Legal Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11,
1985, at Al1.
102. Id. Many of these same arguments can apply to Italy, Yugoslavia, South
Yemen, and Iraq for their assistance in helping Abbas avoid extradition and escape
justice. The fact that only America wanted to prosecute all of the terrorists, including
Abbas, suggests that the other nations had motives other than seeking justice for all of
the participants involved in the hijacking.
of another nation and a violation of international law. 0 3 In other words,
abducting terrorists in another country's territory by unauthorized law
enforcement agents infringes upon a nation's sovereignty and breaches
international law.10 4  This generally creates fertile ground for adverse
reciprocal treatment among nations. The consequences of infringing on
the sovereignty of another nation may increase tension between states
and weaken the fight against overseas terrorism through the use of
international law. 1
05
2. Legal Dimensions Relating to Abduction
a. Breach of State Responsibility
Customary international law holds that a state is normally responsible
for those illegalities which it has originated. 0 6 A state does not bear
responsibility for acts injurious to another state committed by private
individuals when the illegal deeds do not proceed from the command,
authorization, or culpable negligence of the government. 10 7  A state,
103. See FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 16,
23, 31 (1989) [hereinafter FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad] (statement of
Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State).
104. See FoREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 68, § 432(2) (requiring
consent for a state's law enforcement officers to conduct activities within another state).
105. See Bryan F. MacPherson, Building an International Criminal Court for the
21s" Century, 13 CONN. J. INT'L L. 21-23 (1998) (identifying negative implications of
sovereignty infringement under international law through the use of self-help); see also
Timothy F. Malloy, Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 287,
299 (1987) 317 (asserting that countries' failure to abide by existing international laws
weakens the fight against terrorism abroad).
106. Customary international law holds that a state is normally responsible for
those illegalities which it has originated. A state does not bear responsibility for
acts injurious to another state committed by private individuals when the illegal
deeds do not proceed from the command, authorization, or culpable negligence
of the government. However, a state is responsible vicariously for every act of
its own forces, of the members of its government, of private citizens, and of
aliens committed on its territory. If the state neglects the duties imposed by
vicarious responsibility it incurs original liability for the private acts and is guilty
of an international delinquency. No state, however, bears absolute responsibility
for international illegalities committed by individuals acting on its territory.
LASSA OPPENHEIM, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 337-38, 365 (Robert Jennings &
Arthur Watts eds., 8th ed. 1995). The Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N.
Doc. A/2028 (1970), provides, in part, that a state has a duty to "refrain from organizing,
instigating, assisting or participating in... terrorist acts in another state ......
107. Luigi Condorelli, The Imputability to States ofActs of International Terrorism,
19 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 233, 239. No state, however, bears absolute responsibility for
international illegalities committed by individuals acting on its territory. See Report of
the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess, Supp No 10., at 45, U.N.
Doc. A/56/10 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/Stateresponsibility/
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however, is vicariously responsible for every act of its own forces, of the
members of its government, of private citizens, and of aliens committed
on its territory. If the state neglects the duties imposed by vicarious
responsibility, it incurs original liability for the private acts and is guilty
of an international delinquency. 1
8
Under international law, once a government has notice that its territory
is being used for the preparation of hostile acts in or against another
state, it must take effective steps to prevent those acts in order to satisfy
its duty.109 Due to this, Professor Derek Bowett asserts that sending
agents into a state's territory, specifically targeting an individual who,
like a terrorist, is a criminal, does not violate the territorial integrity or
political independence of the state." 0
In any event, the actions of espionage or law enforcement agents
within a nation's territory, though attracting strong condemnation, have
never been considered a use of force under international law."' This
would appear then to provide reasonable grounds for the assertion by
Professor Bowett. 112 Bowett's position finds support in Abraham D.
Sofaer's postulation: "[A] state may cross the border of another state in
order to capture a terrorist, and this act will not necessarily be
considered a violation of that state's sovereignty."
' " 3
b. Self-Defense
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states that "nothing in this present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations." One school of thought, led by Professor Bowett, asserts that
the customary right of self-defense allows a state to use force not only to
defend against an armed attack by another state, but also to protect the
lives or property of nationals or to ensure a state's political independence
responsibility articles(e).pdf#pagemode=bookmarks; United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staffin Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3,74 (May 24).
108. Maogoto, supra note 19, at 416.
109. Findlay, supra note 85, at 23; see G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 106.
110. DEREK BOwETr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (1958); see also
IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 361 (1963).
111. See id. at 56, where Professor Brownlie argues that actions specifically
directed against individuals within the territory of a state do not violate the territorial
integrity or political independence of that state.
112. BOWETTr,supra note 110.
113. Kash, supra note 17, at 79.
against nonmilitary threats. 1 4 Taken to its logical extreme, this argument
supports the proposition that injuring civilians in a foreign country may
amount to an "armed attack" (in as far as citizens and property are
assimilated to the state), as required by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, in
response to which one may engage in self-defense. 1 5
Seizures of suspected terrorists overseas by U.S. officials arguably
constitute a serious breach of the territorial sovereignty of another nation
and a violation of international law. 1 6 This is because sovereignty is
one of the most fundamental attributes of international law.' 17 Under
international law, the government of one country cannot simply conduct
activities in the territory of another country' "-consent of the latter
country is required." 9
c. The Ker-Frisbie Doctrine
U.S. courts have developed what is known as the "Ker-Frisbie Doctrine,"
which holds that a forcible abduction neither offends due process nor
requires a court to free a suspect seized in violation of international
law.120 Therefore, a court need not divest itself of in personam jurisdiction
over a defendant based on the method by which the defendant was
arrested and brought before the court.
12 1
Additionally, American law enforcement officials, relying on statutes
making terrorist attacks on Americans overseas federal crimes, like to refer to
abductions as "arrests." Yet, despite such court rulings and classifications:
The availability of a U.S. law on which to base the issuance of a warrant may
provide law enforcement personnel with the authority to act under U.S. law; it
provides no authority, however, to act under either international law or the law
of the State whose territorial sovereignty is breached. To be acceptable under
international law an abduction must satisfy far more exacting standards than the
mere availability of an arrest warrant issued by the State responsible for the
action.1
22
In a bid to tone down the vitriolic tenor of condemnation from the
international community regarding infringement of territorial integrity,
114. Findlay, supra note 85, at 30.
115. See Oscar Schachter, The Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Terrorist
Bases, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 309, 312 (1989).
116. See FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad, supra note 103.
117. Id. at 31 (describing sovereignty as "one of the most fundamental attributes of
international law").
118. See FOREIGN RELATIONS RESTATEMENT, supra note 68, § 432 cmt. b (explaining
the infringement of sovereignty).
119. Id. § 432(2) (requiring consent for a state's law enforcement officers to
conduct activities within another state).
120. Kash, supra note 17, at 82-83; see also Findlay, supra note 85, at 47.
121. Findlay, supra note 85, at 46.
122. Sofaer, supra note 5, at 106, 110.
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the United States generally has sought to orchestrate abductions in
international airspace and in international waters. According to former
U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz:
[I]t is absurd to argue that international law prohibits us from capturing
terrorists in international waters or airspace, [or] from attacking them on the soil
of other nations. ... A nation attacked by terrorists is permitted to use fze ...
to seize terrorists or rescue its citizens when no other means is available.
This is based on the argument that intercepting an aircraft in international
airspace will likely not rise to the level of a "threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state"
within the meaning of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter.
124 In a
spirited defense of the U.S. position, Abraham D Sofaer asserts:
The principle of territorial integrity is a major-and proper-legal constraint to
taking actions against terrorists or States that support terrorism. World-class
terrorists need bases in which to live and work, to train, to store their weapons,
to make their bombs, and to hold hostages. The States in which they locate are
almost invariably unable or unwilling to extradite them. An extradition request
in such cases will do nothing more than reveal that we know their location, an
advantage that would thereby be squandered. The only possible remedies against
such terrorists often would require infringement of the territorial integrity of the
State in which they are located.
125
As stated above, seizures of suspected terrorists overseas by U.S. officials,
absent consent, arguably constitute a serious breach of the territorial
sovereignty of another nation and a violation of international law. 
126 In a
bid to address the inevitable outrage that abductions attract, U.S. cases
have held that a court would lose its jurisdiction only if the methods of
abduction were "deliberate, unnecessary and [an] unreasonable invasion
of the accused's constitutional rights."12 7 Additionally, U.S. courts have
held that in order for a court to surrender its jurisdiction, the agents'
conduct must be of a "most shocking and outrageous character," a
123. Terry Richard Kane, Prosecuting International Terrorists in United States
Courts: Gaining the Jurisdictional Threshold, 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 294, 339-40 (1987).
124. Kash, supra note 17, at 84.
125. Sofaer, supra note 5, at 106.
126. See FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad, supra note 116. At sovereignty's
core lies the notion that supreme authority within a territory lies with the State, which is
the political institution in which sovereignty is embodied. Two facets hinge at sovereignty's
core, "internal" and "external." Sovereign authority is exercised within borders, but also,
by definition, with outsiders, who may not interfere with the sovereign's governance or
right to control.
127. U.S. v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275267 (2d Cir. 1974), reh'g denied, 504
F.2d 1380 (1974).
classification limited to "torture, brutality and similar outrageous
conduct."'
2 8
In sum, the political and legal reality is that abductions are controversial,
politically risky, and dangerous to the individuals assigned the task. The
forcible removal of a person, especially protected by a state hostile to the
state conducting the abduction, will be treated as criminal conduct,
amounting at the least to a kidnapping. Where the State from which the
person is taken is not hostile but refuses to extradite the person seized
for reasons of policy, abduction is likely to cause a severe strain on
relations. 
29
IV. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: AN EYE FOR AN EYE
A. Terrorists as Warriors: Combatants or Non-Combatants
In December 1973, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 3103,
which granted legitimacy to conflicts involving the struggle of people
against colonial and racist regimes by labeling them as "armed
conflicts.' ' 130 In essence, it classified participants in such conflicts as legal
combatants. One year later, the United Nations adopted a definition of
Aggression, which justified terrorist activities when terrorism is waged
on behalf of self-determination movements or directed against colonial
and racist regimes. 131
Many groups have tried to fall within the scope of justified aggression
under the U.N. definition by claiming that their actions are legal expressions
of their rights. 32 The United Nations has thus contributed to the already
128. U.S. ex rel. Julio Juventino v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 65-66 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
129. "Almost invariably, the state responsible for an abduction has apologized for
the violation of the other state's sovereignty, and often the individual seized is returned
to the state from which he [or /she] was taken." Sofaer, supra note 5, at 110-11. See
also Paul O'Higgins, Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradiction, 36 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 279, 281-82; Martin Feinrider, Kidnapping, 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INT'L LAW
357 (1985); Edwin D. Dickinson, Jurisdiction Following Seizure or Arrest in Violation
of International Law, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (1934); Felice Morgenstern, Jurisdiction in
Seizures Effected in Violation of International Law, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 265; M.
Cherif Bassiouni, Unlawful Seizures and Irregular Rendition Devices as Alternatives to
Extradition, 7 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 25 (1973); Findlay, supra note 85.
130. Basic Principles of the Legal Status of Combatants Struggling Against
Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes, G.A. Res. 3103, U.N. GAOR, 28th
Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/
RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/281/75/IMG/NR028175.pdf?OpenElement (last visited Feb.
9, 2005).
131. Definition ofAggression, supra note 20, at 143-42.
132. The variety of classifications used, resolutions adopted, and laws enacted only
increase the difficulty in differentiating between a terrorist act and a legal and legitimate
act of a freedom fighter. Kash, supra note 17, at 73. Terrorism is generally conducted
by persons who do not fall within the category of combatants, but they are also not in the
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muddied discourse on terrorism by seeming to grant a limited amount of
legitimacy to groups who are responsible for acts that have been labeled
"terrorism." Matters are not helped by states that often give mixed
signals either in condemnation or in tacit support of certain acts that
would appear to fall in the category of terrorism. The end result is the
international community's failure to consistently interpret an act as an
unlawful terrorist attack or a legitimate act of a freedom fighter.
1. Slippery Legal Ground: Positioning the Terrorist in the
Law ofArmed Conflict Framework
International law distinguishes between those who participate in the
armed conflict and those who do not, 13 3 as do the various Geneva
Conventions. 3 4 Generally, soldiers fall within the former definition, as
indeed do members of other armed militias.135 These Conventions also
afford defenses to combatants who have been captured by the enemy
during the course of the fighting 36 by classifying them as prisoners of
war.
The various Geneva Conventions, however, do not refer to the legal
status of civilians who do not fall within the scope of the term
"combatant," yet take an active part in the fighting.138 Recognition of
the need for such a definition grew with the proliferation of civil wars
and revolutionary and/or national liberation movements in the 1960s and
1970s, necessitating a need for the law of armed conflict to cover these
belligerent groups and thus strengthen adherence to international
nature of non-combatants or protected persons. Terrorism is generally directed at persons
who are not combatants; the usual targets are not military personnel or government
officials. The difficult question that continues to persist is: What is the status of the
terrorist in international law? For mention of this conundrum, see, e.g., Alberto R. Coll,
The Legal and Moral Adequacy of Military Responses to Terrorism, 81 AM. Soc'Y INT'L
L. PRoc. 297, 298 (1987); Emanuel Gross, Terrorism and the Problem of Administrative
Detention in Israel: Does a Democracy have a Right to Hold Terrorists as Bargaining
Chips?, 18 ARiz.. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 721 (2002).
133. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, opened for signature Aug. 12,1949, art. 43,11, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
134. See Geneva Conventions, supra note 58.
135. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, supra note 133, 75 U.N.T.S. at 288-292. Civilians are protected in situations of
struggle, and states participating in the war are under an obligation to prevent any
possible harm or suffering to such civilians.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Gross, supra note 5, at 202.
humanitarian law. Accordingly, in 1977, this issue was addressed in
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.139 The amended
Geneva Conventions now provided prisoner of war protection for
fighters who did not fall within the classic structure of conventional
wars-the guerilla or freedom fighter.
Even with regard to these other groups, it is contemplated that the
fighters are "rebel groups" or "non-state actors," such as organized
armed militia or paramilitary groups, with an element of organization
and command structure approximate to or inherent in armed forces,
especially of a political or revolutionary color. Importantly, they should
conduct themselves in accordance with the rules of combat in
international law in order to benefit from the various protections. 40 It is
evident from the final draft of the Protocol that
[The] protection of the interests of the civilian population was preferred over
full protection of freedom fighters. The requirements that those freedom fighters
refrain from intermingling with the civilian population, that they wear uniforms
or other recognizable means of identification, and that they carry their weapons
openly, were specifically intended to ensure that other parties to the conflict
would know against whom they were fighting. These requirements were meant
to ensure that civilians who were not combatants would not be endangered. 14 1
Where then do terrorists fall? They are an enemy, but they do not
comprise soldiers of a state or belligerent group; they wear no uniforms,
have no fixed bases, and pursue uncertain goals with terror as their
weapon of choice. 1
42
Israel, the United States, and the United Kingdom all refused to sign
Additional Protocol I. They argued, inter alia, that it would enable
terrorist organizations to be recognized as combatants, and thereby allow
them to be granted the rights of prisoners of war. 143 In their view it was
not desirable to grant terrorists rights, such as the right not to be tried for
their actions.'44
139. See JUDITH GAIL GARDAM, NON-COMBATANT IMMUNITY AS A NORM OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 100-106 (1993); see generally HEATHER A.
WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL LIBERATION
MovEMENTS (1988).
140. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for
signature Dec. 12, 1977, art. 1, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 16 I.L.M. 1442. Article 1 sets out
the threshold of the material field of application of the rules to non-regular forces. See
generally Peter Rowe, Liability for "War Crimes" During a Non-International Armed
Conflict, in 34 REVUE DE DROIT MILITAIRE ET DE DROIT DE LA GuERRE [REVIEW OF THE
MILITARY RIGHT AND THE RIGHT OF WAR] 149, 152, 157 (1995).
141. Gross, supra note 5, at 203.
142. See, e.g., Robert D. McFadden, A Nation Challenged: In Profile; Bin Laden's
Journey From Rich, Pious Boy to the Mask of Evil, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at B 1.
143. Gross, supra note 5, at 5.
144. Professor Frits Kalshoven, who participated in a 1985 panel on the question
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Terrorism does not exactly comport with the definition 
of war.145
Some scholars, however, classify it as irregular or low intensity warfare
that involves armed attacks against both government and non-government
personnel for political purposes. 146 In this regard, approaching certain
acts of terrorism as a war 147 may be a more appropriate tack because the
military is better equipped for low intensity warfare and is not limited by
restrictions placed on law enforcement. 148 Based on this reality and policy
considerations, and despite the legal and political murkiness surrounding
the status of terrorists in the context of the legal framework governing
armed conflict, the maturation of international terrorism led the United
States to increasingly perceive transnational terrorism 
as acts of war. 149
B. Limited Lethal Military Force: Assassinations
or "Surgical Strikes"
Assassination in historical context, and in the light of its usage in the
laws of war, is, simply, "any unlawful killing of particular individuals
for political purposes."' 0 This position accords with the view that "[e]nemy
combatants who fall into the hands of a state... may not be summarily
"Should the Law of War Apply to Terrorists?," asserted that terrorist organizations and
terrorists are not entitled to the status of combatants:
In these circumstances, a simple statement that the law of armed conflict is
applicable to terrorists seems of little practical utility. Who would be bound by
such an instrument, and to what effect? Would, for instance, the authorities
acquire any additional legal powers that they do not already possess under their
constitutional provisions? Would they become bound to respect any special
rights of terrorists not ensuing from existing human rights instruments? Again,
are we to assume that terrorists must respect the law of armed conflict-with
its express prohibition on acts of terror?
Antigoni Axenidou, Should the Law of War Apply to Terrorists?, 79 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 109, 118 (1985 (1987) (containing panel discussion).
145. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 66, at 1583 (defining "war" as a
"hostile contention by means of armed forces, carried on between nations, states, or
rulers, or between citizens in the same nation or state").
146. Malloy, supra note 105, at 299 (asserting that the military should destroy
terrorist planning and training facilities in nations harboring those terrorists).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 287 (arguing that the use of military action against terrorism as a form of
low intensity warfare would be more effective and beneficial in long-term deterrence,
short-term prevention, and punishment than political, diplomatic, economic, and legal
responses).
149. See 144 CONG. REC. S3002-3 (daily ed. Apr. 1, 1998) (statement of Sen.
Domenici) (emphasizing that the international terrorist threat is not the same as in the
past).
150. Sofaer, supra note 5, 117.
executed, however heinous their personal misdeeds.' ', 5  This rule, however,
has never "preclude[d] attacks on individual soldiers or officers of the
enemy whether in the zone of hostilities, occupied territory, or elsewhere.' 15 2
Such attacks have been accepted as legal without significant controversy. 53
The Hague Convention of 1907, which has become binding customary
international law, 154 prohibits the killing of individuals belonging to the
other side through the use of treacherous or deceitful means during the
course of the war. This prohibition is reaffirmed in Article 37 of
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.155 The United
States encapsulates the international law position through national
proclamations and laws. 156
Despite international and domestic prohibition, assassination is seen as
having several advantages. They include pulverizing tactical and
organizational capability, preempting attacks, meting out justice to
operational commanders, and limiting collateral damage that inevitably
results from large-scale military incursions. These practical and operational
attractions have led the United States to occasionally use assassination. 157
This was evident on November 4, 2002 when an unmanned CIA
Predator drone in Yemen launched two "Hellfire" missiles striking a car
carrying Al Qaeda operatives, including the Al Qaeda chief in that
151. Id. at 120.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Nations must comply with customary international regardless whether they
signed the convention that first introduced it. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE LAWS OF WAR
19-22 (1983). Customary law is considered to embrace principles accepted by civilized
states. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055,
3 Bevans 1179.
155. See Protocol Additional to The Geneva Conventions of 1949 Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict, opened for signature Dec. 12,
1977, art. 37, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391.
156. Compare U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, FM 27-10: DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD
MANUAL: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 17 ("[Article 23b of the 1907 Hague Regulations]
is construed as prohibiting assassination, proscription, or outlawry of an enemy, or
putting a price upon an enemy's head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy 'dead or
alive"'); with Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. 200, 213 (1982), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.
§ 401 (West 2005) ("No person employed or acting on behalf of the U.S. Government
shall engage in, or conspire to engage in assassination"). This order, issued by President
Reagan, which remains in effect and is binding on all executive branch personnel, is
derived from a virtually identical provision issued by President Ford in 1976, Exec.
Order No. 11,905, 3 C.F.R. 90, 99 (1977), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (West 2005).
The only substantive change in the prohibition since that date is that the earliest version
prohibited "political" assassination; the word "political" was deleted from the order by
President Carter in 1978. Exec. Order No. 12,036, 3 C.F.R. 112, 129 (1979), reprinted
in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (West 2005).
157. Assassination, though, is very evident in Israel's responses to suicide
bombings and other terrorist acts. See Harel Amos & Gideon Alon, IDF Lawyers Set
"Conditions" For Assassination Policy, HA'ARETZ (Isr.), Feb. 4, 2002, available at
www.haaretzdaily.com.
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country who was wanted for the bombing of the USS Cole.'
58
Assassination, however, is a highly controversial counter-terrorism
measure in view of the fact that states are obliged by international law
not to carry out assassinations. The United States and Israel claim that
occasionally operational necessities override the law, as "surgical strikes"
target the brains behind terrorist activities and thus offer a discriminating
counter measure that limits collateral civilian casualties often found in
larger scale military operations. 159 There is both legal and moral distaste,
however, for official killing and, especially, the intentional killing of
specific individuals for political and policy 
reasons. 160
1. Assassination: Moral Dilemma but Effective Response?
From a tactical standpoint, a limitation on assassination undoubtedly
disadvantages states in a contest with states or groups that routinely resort to
murder, even of citizens having nothing to do with their political objectives.
The major dilemma is whether there can be a proper use of assassination?
It is accepted that in domestic cases of terrorism, the state is entitled to
use force against terrorists operating within its own territory. Even this
entitlement, however, is subject to constraints. If no imminent danger is
anticipated, it is forbidden to use force against the terrorists. A terrorist
may not be killed for his past actions, thereby preventing him from
realizing his right to a fair trial.
161
In other words, force may not be used against a terrorist as a punitive act,
but only as a preemptive act. Similarly, the state is bound and subject to a
number of core human rights, both under international and domestic law,
that are eviscerated when terrorists (actual or suspected) 
are assassinated.
162
Whether or not the assassination of terrorists or perceived terrorists is
justified presents not just a legal dilemma but a moral one as well:
158. Sources: U.S. Kills Cole Suspect, CNN ONLINE, Nov. 5, 2002, at http://www.cnn.
com/2002/WORLD/meast/l 1/04/yemen.blast/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
159. See, e.g., The Surgical Strike is a Myth, JANE'S FOREIGN RPT., Sept. 18, 2001 at
http://www.janes.com/security/intemational security/news/fr/fI00918 1 n.shtml (last visited
Mar. 5, 2005); Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting, Action Alert: "Precise" and "Surgical":
NBC's Bombing Claims Lack Verification, Mar. 26, 2003, at http://www.fair.org/
activism/nbc-bombs.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
160. Sofaer, supra note 5, at 116-21.
161. Gross, supra note 5, at 224; see Jami Melissa Jackson, The Legality of
Assassination of Independent Terrorist Leaders: An Examination of National and
International Implications, 24 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 669, 686-87 (1999).
162. Gross, supra note 5, at 224.
If the killing of terrorists will prevent the death, or serious injury, of many innocent
people, then, at least according to the principle of moral utilitarianism, it would seem
possible to kill them. The justification of any action as proper, according to this
approach, is determined by whether the action will lead to the best possible result
among all the possible outcomes in that situation. In other words, one must aspire to
the maximum general good in each and every situation. If the good result ensuing
from the performance of the act outweighs the bad ensuing from it, then tpust be
performed, irrespective of whether the act entails killing, torture, or the like.
But even in the case of ticking bomb situations that Gross's above
quotation seems to allude to, that a particular terrorist will cause great
damage or deaths of innocent civilians must be proved to a relatively high
degree of certainty.
164
The decision to foil a terrorist act by killing the terrorists must be made with
thorough consideration and after exhausting all other possible actions. If there is no
other reasonable way of preventing the terrorist action and it is possible to kill enemy
soldiers who are about to attack one's army, then it is possible to kill the
terrorists. 165
Attacks aimed at specific individuals potentially involve claims of
"assassination," which is prohibited under international law. Prohibiting
"assassination" is legally, militarily, and morally sound. Assassination
is, in essence, intentional and unlawful killing-murder-for political
purposes. Besides the use of limited force, states often respond with
large scale military force in situations where terrorist acts are tied to
state-sponsors. The Article next turns to an analysis of this measure.
C. Large-Scale Military Force: Terrorism as an Act of War
In the early years of the United Nations, the use of military force as a
counter-terrorism measure was debated almost entirely in terms of Israeli
counter-terror practice. 16 6 Many emphasized that Israel's defiance of the
United Nations and U.N. war-decision law destroyed respect for the
United Nations and intemational law. U.N. debates emphasizing the illegality
of the preemptive character of the Israeli actions, however, suffered from
a tendency to mix jus ad bellum with jus in bello, thus preventing
development of any meaningful discourse. 
167
163. Id. at 229-30.
164. Id. at 234.
165. Id. at 234.
166. This is not surprising considering that a Palestinian group (the militant Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine) was responsible for hijacking an Israeli El Al
commercial flight on July 22, 1968-the incident that is considered to mark the
beginning of the current era of international terrorism. As Dr. Bruce Hoffman notes,
"[a]lthough commercial planes had often been hijacked before, this was the first clearly
political hijacking." Hoffman, supra note 14.
167. Many thorny questions relating to the Arab-Israeli Conflict served to split the
international community regarding the use of military force against an uncertain mosaic
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The debate on the use of military force was renewed with the U.S.
attack on Libya on April 15, 1986, causing a different dimension of the
complexities of the Arab-Israeli conflict to come to light. The United States
(whose interests and citizens were and are a primary target of terrorists)
replaced Israel in the classic confrontation between the Security Council's
restrictive view of counter-terror self-defense and the concomitant
permissive view of war of national liberation terrorism, as well as the
long-held Israeli view of the efficacy of counter-terror self-defense and
deterrence.
The United States had reached the conclusion that counter-terror self-
defense and deterrence warranted preventive/retaliatory military attacks.
The new U.S. policy was of particular interest as it was unencumbered
by the political and legal complexities of Israel, which was involved in a
war against terror, suppression of resistance, and obligations of an
occupying power-all on one tapestry.
1. The Cold War Era: Terrorist Action and Reaction
a. State Responsibility
It is beyond dispute that states are directly responsible under
international law for controlling terrorists operating within their borders
and have a responsibility to refrain from actively supporting terrorist
organizations. 168 As early as 1970, the U.N. General Assembly, in Resolution
2625, made it clear that a state's mere acquiescence in terrorist activity
emanating from its soil is a violation of the state's international
obligations. 69 Numerous other resolutions from both the U.N. General
Assembly and the U.N. Security Council and other contemporary
international instruments 7 ° leave no doubt that harboring or supporting
of a war of national liberation and a war against terrorism. Many difficult issues surround the
conflict, which pose a number of complex issues including: Doesn't international law
permit an insurgent force directed toward support of fundamental rights and rules?
Aren't insurgents entitled to use certain levels and types of force against a regime that
represses their peremptory right to "self-determination" and hence "national liberation?"
Isn't Israel necessarily bound to whatever its preservation and safety require? Hasn't a
kind of holy war warrant been extended to the PLO where jus ad bellum judgments
about the war of national liberation have swallowed up any concern for the war-conduct,
jus in bello issues?
168. Richard B. Lillich & John M. Paxman, State Responsibility for Injuries to
Aliens Occasioned by Terrorist Activities, 26 AM. U. L. REv. 217, 245, 261 (1976).
169. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 106.
170. See, e.g., G.A. Res. No. 40/61, supra note 26; S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 47th
terrorist groups violates a state's responsibility under international
law.
171
Several decisions of arbitral tribunals have granted substantial damages
against states in the past for failing to prevent persons within their
jurisdictions from conducting hostile activities against other states. Primary
examples include the $15,500,000 awarded to the United States in the late
19th century in a proceeding against Britain for allowing a Confederate
warship (The Alabama) to be completed and to leave British territory. 72
Similarly, in the Texas Cattle Claims arbitration, the United States
successfully pursued a claim against Mexico with regard to the actions
of Mexican-based outlaws and military personnel. The American-Mexican
Claims Commission found Mexico liable on four legal bases for raids
into Texas by outlaws or military personnel, namely:
(1) active participation of Mexican officials in the depredations; (2) permitting
the use of Mexican territory as a base for wrongful actions against the US and
the citizens thereof, thus encouraging the wrongful acts; (3) negligence, over along period of years, to prosecute or otherwise to discourage or prevent theraids; and (4) failure to cooperate with the Government of the US in the matter
of terminating the condition in question. 173
The position by the arbitral tribunals has been reaffirmed by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the Corfu Channel Case as well
as the Iran Hostage Case, the ICJ found that Albania and Iran, respectively,
had a duty under international law to make every reasonable effort to
prevent illegal acts against foreign states. 174 They had acted unlawfully
by knowingly allowing their territory to be used for illegal acts. 175 In the
setting of terrorism, the circumstances are much the same; a state is
bound under international law to prevent the use of its territory as a base
Sess., 3063d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992); Draft Articles on Responsibility of States forInternationally Wrongful Acts: Report of the International Law Commission on the Work ofits Fifty-Third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).171. In November 2001, the International Law Commission completed work on itsDraft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. Article
8 of these Draft Articles provides:
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of aState under international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting
on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of that State in carrying
out the conduct.
Id.
172. This vessel subsequently distinguished itself as the most successful Confederateraider by capturing or destroying more than sixty Union vessels. JOHN B. MOORE, A DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 999 (1970).
173. American Mexican Claims Comm'n, Report to the U.S. Sec'y of State, reprinted
in M.MuORIE M. WHrTEMAN, 8 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 748, 753 (1967).
174. Corfu Channel Case (UK v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Dec. 5); United StatesDiplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 32-33, 36 (May 24).
175. Id.
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or sanctuary. The nature of the terrorist threat, however, dictates decisive
action by a state to deal with the menace and forecloses a wait to facilitate
the use of peaceful avenues.
The idea that if a state is unable to or unwilling to effectively police its
territory, then a victim state can reach across borders and take necessary
action, was not a new one. In 1818, when the U.S. sent troops into
Spanish Florida, it established the right to enter the territory of another
state to prevent terror attacks where the host was unable or unwilling to
quell a continuing threat. 
17 6
In contemporary times, the same problem of state sponsorship of
illegal activity that includes offering safe haven and enhancing capabilities
of insurgents persists, only the threat-international terrorism-is more
urgent. This strikes at the heart of a nation's duty to protect its citizens
and national interests. States that sponsor terrorism have a great
capacity to evade responsibility relating to the actions of terrorist groups
they support.
For years states have supplied funds, arms, and sanctuary to known terrorist
organizations without being treated as having responsibility for the terrorist
actions. In such situations, states claim they have no knowledge of or do not
support terrorist actions, and they explain their support for the involved
on the ground that the groups have other, legitimate purposes. 
17 roUpS
The end result is that states that sponsor terrorism attempt to protest
that they are at "arms-length" and thus not part and parcel of the terrorist
enterprise. Even in situations where state complicity is established,
states often claim that they have warned suspected terrorist organizations
that they will expel them if proved guilty of a terrorist act.
178
176. For years, southern plantation owners and white farmers lost runaway slaves to
the Florida swamps with friendly Seminole and Creek Indians who offered refuge to the
slaves and led raids against white settlers. The U.S. government could do little about the
problem because the swamps lay deep within Spanish Florida. President James Monroe
directed General Andrew Jackson to proceed against the Seminole Indians, with the
explanation that the Spanish were bound by treaty to keep their Indians at peace, but
were incompetent to do so. Jackson invaded Florida in 1818, burned Seminole villages,
hanged tribal leaders, captured Pensacola, and deposed the Spanish governor. See JOHN
B. MOORE, 2 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 404 (1906).
177. Sofaer, supra note 5, at 100-101.
178. See, e.g., Hafez Assad et. al., Following An Independent Course, TIME, Apr. 3,
1989, at 30 (statement of Hafez Assad, President of Syria).
i. Attacks on Terrorist Infrastructure and Camps
In December 1985, several airline passengers were killed by terrorists
in simultaneous attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports, including five
Americans; many more were wounded.1 79  Immediately after these
attacks in which several civilians were killed, the Libyan leader Muammar
Qadhafi labeled the killers as "heroes." 180 The united States was incensed
and moved swiftly to impose drastic sanctions short of force. 1 ' Then,
U.S. President Ronald Reagan had this warning:
By providing material support to terrorist groups which attack U.S. citizens,
Libya has engaged in armed aggression against the U.S. under established
principles of international law, just as if [Qadhafi] had used its own armed
forces. . . . If these [economic and political] steps do not end Qadhafi's
terrorism, I promise you that further steps will be taken.
182
Shortly thereafter, on April 5, 1986, Le Belle discotheque in West
Germany, a popular hang-out for the off-duty American servicemen, was
bombed, leaving two Americans dead and 154 persons injured.183 U.S.
intelligence indicated Libya sponsored this terrorist attack'1 4 and was
about to order additional attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities
throughout Europe. 85 President Reagan responded to this threat by
bombing military targets in Tripoli and Benghazi, Libya on April 14,
1986.18
In deciding to use military force against Libya, deterrence certainly
was a major, if not the primary, consideration.' 87 President Reagan
179. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 5, at 103.
180. Sofaer, supra note 5, at 103.
181. Id.
182. President's News Conference, PuB. PAPERS 17-18 (Jan. 7, 1986). A few
weeks after President Reagan's warning, on January 15, 1986, then U.S. Secretary of
State, George P. Shultz repeated the point:
There should be no confusion about the status of nations that sponsor terrorism
against Americans and American property. There is substantial legal authority
for the view that a state which supports terrorist or subversive attacks against
another state, or which supports or encourages terrorist planning and other
activities within its own territory, is responsible for such attacks. Such conduct
can amount to an ongoing armed aggression against the other state under
international law.
Secretary George Schultz, Address Before the Low-Intensity Warfare Conference at the
National Defense University (Jan. 15, 1986), in DEP'T ST. BULL., Mar. 1986, at 15, 17.
183. John Tagliabue, 2 Killed, 155 Hurt in Bomb Explosion at Club in Berlin, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 6, 1986, at At. One serviceman was killed in the blast; another died of
wounds shortly after.
184. President Ronald Reagan, Address to the Nation (Apr. 14, 1986), reprinted in
DEP'T OF STATE BULL., June 1986, at 8.
185. Richard Halloran, U.S. on World Alert, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1986, at A18.
186. David Turndorf, The U.S. Raid on Libya: A Forceful Response to Terrorism,
14 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 187, 187 n.1 (1988).
187. As Major Phillip A. Seymour notes:
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emphasized that the United States would act "with others if possible and
alone if necessary to insure that terrorists have no sanctuary anywhere."'
88
Despite the U.S. claim that the Berlin bombing had actually been ordered
by the Libyan government, the U.S. action was widely condemned. 8 9 The
U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution condemning the United
States,' 90 and a proposed Security Council resolution condemning the
U.S. action failed to pass owing to vetoes by the United States, the
United Kingdom, and France. 191
b. Retaliatory Strikes
When the U.N. Charter was drafted in 1945, the right of self-defense
was the only included exception to the prohibition of the use of force,
though customary international law had previously accepted reprisal,
retaliation, and retribution as legitimate responses as well. 92  Since
1953, the use of force by way of reprisals has been strongly condemned
by the United Nations as an illegal use of force under the U.N. Charter.1
9 3
Although President Reagan cited self-defence under Article 51 of the U.N.
Charter as the legal basis for the air strike, his explanation implicitly included
retaliation (i.e., reprisal) as an additional justification.... In deciding to use
military force against Libya, deterrence certainly was a major, if not the primary,
consideration.... This interpretation is supported by then Vice President George
Bush's comments a month prior to the Libyan raid when he stated that American
policy in combating terrorism would be one of a willingness to "retaliate."
Major Phillip A. Seymour, The Legitimacy of Peacetime Reprisal as a Tool against
State-Sponsored Terrorism 39 NAVAL L. REV. 221, 223 (1990). See also President
Ronald Reagan, International Terrorism, in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BUREAU OF PUB.
AFFAIRS, SPEC. REP. No. 24, 1986, at 1; a concise analysis in Gregory Francis Intoccia,
American Bombing of Libya: An International Legal Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L.
L. 177, 197-200 (1987).
188. President Ronald Reagan, supra note 187, at 1.
189. Steven R. Weisman, Parley in India Condemns Bombings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
16, 1986, at A16; John Tagliabue, OPEC Ministers Reject Libya Appeal, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 16, 1986, at A20; Bernard Gwertzman, Hanoi, Citing Attack, Suspends Talks on
Missing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1986, at A4.
190. G.A. Res. No 41/38, U.N. GAOR, 41st Sess., 78th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/41/38 (1986).
191. Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of "Armed Attack" in Article 51
of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 41, 47 (2002).
192. Reprisal allows a state to commit an act that is otherwise illegal to counter the
illegal act of another state. Retaliation is the infliction upon the delinquent state of the
same injury that it has caused the victim. Retribution is a criminal law concept, implying
vengeance that is sometimes used loosely in the international law context as a synonym
for retaliation. See generally MALCOLM N. SHAw, INTERNATIONAL LAW 777-91 (4th ed.
1997).
193. BowETr,supra note 110, at 13-14.
Though some in the international community would argue that reprisal
action is inherent to maintaining security, most states condemn the
practice. 194
In the 1980s, frustration with the legal strictures inherent in the
concept of self-defense in the face of the ever-increasing threat of
terrorism and the inability to root out terrorist groups led the United
States down the path that Israel had embarked on many years earlier-a
resort to retaliatory strikes against terrorist cells located in sovereign
states.
The U.S. stance towards terrorism of "passive, reactive and patient
defense response"' 95 in the early 1970s shifted to a "no compromise"
and very proactive approach. 196 In National Security Decision Directive
138 (NSDD 138), signed on April 3, 1984, President Reagan signaled
that as far as the executive branch was concerned, the debate over
whether military force was within or without the range of counter-
terrorism measures was over. Defense Department official Noel Koch
explained that NSDD 138 "represent[ed] a quantum leap in countering
terrorism, from the reactive mode to recognition that proactive steps
[were] needed."' 197 Henceforth, the United States would use military
force in both pre-emptive and retaliatory scenarios with an aim of
ensuring swift and effective retribution.
The U.S. policy position that ".... retaliation against terrorist attacks is a
legitimate response and an expression of self-defense"' 198 was practically
194. Byard Q. Clemmons & Gary D. Brown, Rethinking International Self-Defense:
The United Nations'Emerging Role, 45 NAVAL L. REV. 217, 225 (1998).
195. Shirlyce Manning, The United States' Response To International Air Safety, 61
J. AIR L. & COM. 505, 519 (Dec. 1995-Jan. 1996).
196. Ronald D. Crelinsten & Alex P. Schmid, Western Responses to Terrorism: A
Twenty-Five Year Balance Sheet, in WESTERN RESPONSES TO TERRORISM 307 (Alex P.
Schmid & Ronald D. Crelinsten eds., 1992).
197. Robert C. Toth, Preemptive Anti-Terrorist Raids Allowed, WASH. POST., Apr.
16, 1984, at A19. The National Security Decision Directive remains classified.
198. See Bernard Gwertzman, US Supports Attack, Jordan and Egypt Vow to Press
for Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1985, at A9. U.S. Ambassador Walters supported the
Israeli justification for the attack in spite of the abstention:
My Government could not support the draft resolution, disproportionately
placing all blame for this latest round of the rising spiral of violence in the
Middle East onto only one set of shoulders, while not also holding at fault
those responsible for the terrorist acts which provoked it .... We speak of a
pattern of violence, but we must be clear: it is terrorism that is the cause of this
pattern, not responses to terrorist attacks .... [W]e recognize and strongly
support the principle that a state subjected to continuing terrorist attacks may
respond with appropriate use of force to defend itself against further attacks.
This is an aspect of the inherent right of self-defence recognized in the United
Nations Charter. We support this principle regardless of attacker, and
regardless of victim.
U.N. SCOR, 40th Sess., 2615th mtg. at 111-12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2615 (1985).
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expressed by Israel on October 1, 1985. Six F-15 Israel fighter-bombers
unleashed a barrage of bombs on the headquarters of the Palestine
Liberation Organization in a suburb of Tunis, the capital of Tunisia,
responding to alleged terrorist attacks. 199 Israel Defense Minister Yitzhak
Rabin seemed to be almost echoing U.S. policy when he stated: "We
decided the time was right to deliver a blow to the headquarters of those
who make the decisions, plan and carry out terrorist activities.
' 200
The U.N. Security Council was swift to vigorously condemn the act of
armed aggression perpetrated by Israel against Tunisian territory in
flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations, international law,
and norms of conduct. 20 1 Though based on state responsibility, the strike
against Libya, which followed the German disco bombing, was also
justified on the basis of retaliation.20 2
A sharp distinction has also been drawn between the use of force in
self-defense and its use in reprisals.20 3 Reprisals and retaliatory strikes
are illegal under contemporary international law because they are
punitive, rather than legitimate actions of self-defense.2° It would be
difficult to reconcile acts of reprisal with the overriding dictate in the
U.N. Charter that all disputes must be settled by peaceful means. Further,
under the U.N. Charter regarding self-defense, there are three main
principles that go into examining the jus ad bellum dimensions of a
state's response if it has suffered a terrorist attack.20 5 These principles,
199. The Israeli attack by six F-15 fighter-bombers apparently left seventy men, women,
and children dead and more than one hundred Tunisians and Palestinians wounded. See Cycle
of Terrorism Will Continue With Retaliatory Strikes, HOUSTON POST, Jan. 2, 1986 at 2B.
200. Israel Calls Bombing a Warning to Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,1985, at A8.
201. Three days after the attack, a single session of the Security Council adopted
Resolution 573 (with the only abstention by the United States), which condemned the
Israeli attack; demanded that Israel "refrain from perpetrating such acts of aggression or
from the threat to do so;" urged member states to "dissuade Israel from resorting to such
acts;" and supported Tunisia's right to reparations. S.C. Res. 573, U.N. SCOR, 40th
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (1985) (vote: 14-0-1), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1740-41.
202. Seymour, supra note 187, at 223.
203. The legal status of reprisals is stated very succinctly by Professor Ian
Brownlie: "The provisions of the Charter relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes
and non-resort to the use of force are universally regarded as prohibiting reprisals which
involve the use of force." BROWNLIE, supra note 110, at 281 (internal citation omitted).
204. Id. at 13.
205. In an exchange of diplomatic notes between the governments of the United States
and Great Britain, then-U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined a framework for
self-defense. Military response to a threat was judged permissible so long as the danger
posed was "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment of
deliberation." CHARLES C. HYDE, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND
which deal with the timeliness of the response and the requirements of
necessity and proportionality, are difficult to reconcile with retaliatory
strikes.
D. Post-Cold War: A New Epoch in Terror
and Counter-Terrorism Responses
With the end of the Cold War, acts generally described as "terrorism"
proliferated in frequency and severity. The rise of globalization and
decolonization, and the increasing accessibility and availability of weapons
and technology, was quickly enabling well-financed and organized
terrorist organizations to transform themselves into global outfits with
greater reach and lethality. °6 As transnational terrorism became more of
a threat, "the world community became more tolerant of military actions
against states that supported terrorism.
' 20 7
The new mood within the international community was captured in
the early 1990s in the reaction of the international community to the
1988 Pan Am bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland. The Security Council
characterized as a threat to international peace and security Libyan
support for terrorism. In Resolution 748, the Security Council imposed
economic sanctions on Libya for its continuing involvement with terrorist
activities and for its refusal to extradite two Libyan nationals alleged to
have been involved in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. The Council
affirmed that:
In accordance with Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations,
every State has a duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or
participating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized
activities within its territory directed toward the commission of such acts, when
such acts involve a threat or use of force.20 8
In characterizing Libyan action as a threat to international peace and
security, it would seem that the door to possible use of military force had
been opened. After all, Article 1(1) states that the purpose of the United
Nations is:
[M]aintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to
APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 240 (2nd ed. 1945). The Caroline criteria of necessity
and proportionality became widely accepted as customary international law and, as a
consequence, form part of the concept of self-defense encapsulated later in the U.N.
Charter.
206. In relation to the rise of terrorism, see generally PETER CHALK, WEST EUROPEAN
TERRORISM AND COUNTER-TERRORISM: THE EVOLViNG DYNAMIc 25-44, 65-90 (1996).
207. Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 4, at 106.
208. S.C. Res. 748, supra note 170, at 52.
[VOL. 6: 243, 2005] Countering Terrorism
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J.
bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice
and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.
209
Such purpose makes clear the importance, "in the legal order embodied
in the Charter, of maintaining international peace but also the readiness
to use force to combat aggression and to prevent threats to the peace
from materializing into acts of aggression or breaches of the peace-the
Charter is about keeping the peace not about 
pacifism.,
2 10
The new pugnacious mood was further manifest by the fact that there
was little objection to the 1993 cruise missile attacks against Iraq for its
role in the foiled assassination attempt on the life of former President
George Bush, Sr.21 1 Five years later, when the United States bombed
terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan in reaction to the bombings of
two of its embassies in East Africa, the world reaction to the U.S. attacks
against Afghanistan was muted.
212 While the criticism of the bombing
of the pharmaceutical factory in Sudan was more intense, the protest was
largely confined to the quantity of proof presented by the United States
that chemical weapons were processed at the factory. Neither the Security
Council nor the General Assembly took any formal action with regard to
either attack.
1. September 1]: Crossing the Rubicon
On September 11, 2001, in a terrorist attack whose audacity and horrific
toll left the world reeling, four commercial aircraft were hijacked and
crashed into the symbols of American supremacy-its economic
dominance and military might. Two of them were flown into the twin towers
of the World Trade Center in New York City, causing both buildings to
209. U.N. CHARTER, art 1(1).
210. Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force:
Afghanistan, Al Qaida and Iraq, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 7, 10 (2003).
211. See Jack Plaxe, Terrorists Must Pay a Price, WASH. POST., July 10, 1993, at
A17.
212. International reaction to the 1998 U.S. cruise missile strikes against terrorist
targets in Afghanistan and Sudan in response to the U.S. embassy bombings in East
Africa was mixed, with the most intense criticism focused on the Sudan attack. Western
European nations supported the U.S. actions to varying degrees, while the Russian
President Boris Yeltsin declared that he was "outraged" by the "indecent" behavior of
the United States. China issued an ambiguous statement condemning terrorism and
Japan said it "understood America's resolute attitude towards terrorism." See Phil
Reeves, Outraged Yeltsin Denounces "Indecent" U.S. Behaviour, INDEP. (London), Aug.
2, 1998, at 2.
collapse, a third aircraft crashed into the Pentagon building in Arlington,
Virginia, which houses the headquarters of the U.S. Department of
Defense and the U.S. armed forces, the fourth aircraft, crashed near Somerset,
Pennsylvania.213
The tragic events of September 11 prompted the international community
to examine international terrorism anew. The magnitude of the acts went
beyond terrorism as it was known, and statements from various capitals
around the world pointed to a need to develop new strategies to confront
a new reality. Previously acts of terrorism were seen as criminal acts,
carried out by private, non-governmental entities.21 4  In contrast, the
September 11 attacks were regarded as an act of war.2 15 This effectively
marked a turning point in the long-standing premise of international law
that force, aggression, and "armed attacks" are instruments of relations
between states.2 16 Terrorism was no longer merely a serious threat to
peace and stability to be combated through domestic and international
penal mechanisms-use of force was now an avenue for managing the
consequences of terrorist strikes.
a. State Responsibility Marches to New Frontiers
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the statements were strident
and unequivocal. On the day of the attacks, President George Bush Jr.
stated succinctly: "We will make no distinction between the terrorists
who committed these acts and those who harbor them."21 7 Congress, in its
joint resolution of September 14, 2001, authorized the use of force against
those who "aided" or "harbored" those who carried out the September
11 attacks, as well as those who committed the attacks.218 On September
16, 2001, Vice President Cheney stated that "if you provide sanctuary to
terrorists, you face the full wrath of the United States of America. 21 9
In a speech before a joint session of Congress on September 20, 2001,
a pugnacious President Bush stated: "From this day forward, any nation
that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the US
213. Rensselaer Lee & Raphael Perl, Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy, in
MAJOR STUDIES AND ISSUE BRIEFS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH CENTER 1 (Supp.
2002).
214. Maogoto, supra note 19, at 407.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. In his address to the nation immediately following the terrorist attacks on
September 11 th, President Bush stated that America would "make no distinction between
the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them." President George
W. Bush, Address to the Nation, reprinted in WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2001, at A2.
218. After the Attacks: Text of Joint Resolution Allowing Military Attacks, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2001, at A16.
219. It's going to Require Constant Vigilance, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 2001, at A12.
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as a hostile regime. 22°  The message was later firmly reiterated in
sweeping terms:
America has a message for the nations of the world: If you harbor terrorists, you
are terrorists. If you train or arm a terrorist, you are a terrorist. If you feed a
terrorist or fund a terrorist, you're a terrorist, and you will be held accountable
by the U.S. and our friends.
221
The guiding principle reflected by these statements to treat those who
harbor terrorists no differently than the terrorists themselves was described
by White House spokesman Ari Fleischer as "a dramatic change in
American policy. 22 2 Yet while the breadth of these statements appeared at
odds with the tenor of the international legal regime on the use of force,
the world community either said little about this change in policy or
endorsed it.223 This lack of reaction, as well as the wide support that the
United States would soon enjoy in its military campaign against Afghanistan,
was perceived in certain quarters as "perhaps the strongest manifestation
of evolving customary international law regarding the use of force
against terrorism.
', 224
i. Operation "Enduring Freedom"
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the United
States connected the Taliban regime to Al Qaeda on the grounds that it
harbored Osama bin Laden and his organization, refused to deliver bin
Laden to requesting states, and that the Taliban increased their
responsibility for Al Qaeda's actions after-the-fact by endorsing the
220. President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the
American People (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/09/20010920-8.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
221. President George W. Bush, Remarks to Troops and Families at Fort Campbell
(Nov. 21, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ releases/2001/11/20011121-
3.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2005). See also U.S. Ambassador James Cunningham, Statement
to the U.N. General Assembly (Sept. 12, 2001) ("There should be no doubt: we will deal
with those who support and harbor terrorists as we deal with the terrorists themselves"),
available at http://www.un.intlusa/01_124.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2005).
222. Wendy S. Ross, No Discussions, No Negotiations with Taliban, White House
Says, Sept 21, 2001, at http://www.usembassy.it/file2001_09/alia/alO92110.htm. See
also Press Release, White House, Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer (Sept. 25, 2001)
(statement of Ari Fleischer) ("I think you need to look at it exactly as the President
described it, which is that anybody who harbors terrorism will be the target of our
operations and the target of our actions"), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2001/09/
2 0 0 10925-3.html.
223. Travalio & Altenburg, supra note 4, at 109.
224. Id.
September 11 attacks.225 The symbiotic relationship of Al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan and the Taliban regime meant that the Taliban shared
significant responsibility for Al-Qaeda's actions in the September 11
attack.
Before the United States even attacked Afghanistan, the U.N. Security
Council affirmed that the September 11 attacks gave rise to a right of
self-defense. Passed by the Council the day after the attacks,
Resolution 1368 condemned the attacks and recognized "the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense in accordance with the
Charter.
227
Resolution 1373, passed seventeen days later by the Security Council,
reaffirmed the right of self-defense in the context of the September 11
attacks and went on to reaffirm "the need to combat by all means, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international
peace and security caused by terrorist acts. 228 Moreover, the Security
Council's subsequent characterization of those acts as "armed attacks"
was echoed by other international bodies. 229 Thus, the United States
enjoyed strong support from the Security Council before it had to
articulate the actual case for its actions in Afghanistan and despite the
possibility that existing restrictions on the right of self-defense precluded
a lawful exercise of that right under the circumstances.
Professor J. M. Beard notes: "The unprecedented response of the U.N.
Security Council and the international community in general to the
September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States provides a stark contrast
to the reaction to the raid on Libya [in 1986].,,23o He concludes by
asserting that a number of factual and legal distinctions between the
circumstances surrounding the September 11 attacks and previous
terrorist attacks giving rise to the use of force by the United States
225. Michael Byers, Terrorism, the Use of Force and International Law after 11
September 2001, 51 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 401, 408-09 (2002).
226. S.C. Res. 1368, U.N.SCOR, 56th Sess, 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368
(2001).
227. Id.
228. S.C. Res 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th sess, 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1373
(2001).
229. Press Release, North Atlantic Council, Statement by North Atlantic Council
(Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01124e.htm (last visited
Feb. 9, 2005). The Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States, meeting in
consultation, likewise invoked the 1947 Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,
declaring that "these terrorist attacks against the United States of America are attacks
against all American States." Terrorist Threat to the Americas, Org. of American States,
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 24th mtg., OAS Doc. RC.24/Res.1/01
(Sept. 21, 2001), available at http://www.oas.org/OASpage/crisis/ RC.24e.htm (last
visited Feb. 9, 2005).
230. Jack M. Beard, America's New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense
under International Law, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y. 559, 565 (2002).
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demonstrated the propriety of this particular exercise of self-defense
under Article 51 and customary international law.
231 These positive
sentiments are based on the willingness of states and the U.N. Security
Council to invoke and affirm the right of self-defense in response to the
September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, in sharp contrast to
previous terrorist attacks. In any case:
Before the September 11 terrorist attacks, the U.N. Security Council had never
approved a resolution explicitly invoking and reaffirming the inherent right of
individual and collective self-defense in response to a particular terrorist attack.
... The Council's unprecedented willingness to invoke and reaffirm self-defense
under Article 51 in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks is an
important act and, for some states, helped legitimize the US military response as
a legal use of force.
232
"Operation Enduring Freedom" commenced on October 7, 2001 with
a mix of air strikes from land-based bombers, carrier-based jetfighters,
and cruise missiles. The initial military objectives of "Operation Enduring
Freedom" included the destruction of terrorist training camps and
infrastructure within Afghanistan, the capture of Al Qaeda leaders, and
the cessation of terrorist activities in Afghanistan.233 By October 20,
2001, U.S. and Coalition forces had destroyed virtually all Taliban air
defenses. By mid-March 2002, the Taliban had been removed from
power and the Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan had been destroyed.
3
"Operation Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan signaled a renewed
determination on the part of the United States to combat international
terrorism and states that sponsor it, as well as laid fertile ground for
debate on the strategic or legal approach that states should adopt in
responding to such threats. This was coupled with a recognition that the
modem threat to U.S. power and security rises not from one particular
organization, but from the growing threat of international terrorism,




233. As articulated by President George W. Bush on Sept. 20, 2001, supra note 220.
234. Operations in Afghanistan involved significant contributions from the
international community. By 2002 the coalition had grown to more than sixty-eight nations,
with twenty-seven nations having representatives at the U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM) headquarters.
235. The war on terror "will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has
been found, stopped and defeated.... From this day forward, any nation that continues
to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the U.S. as a hostile regime."
President George W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American
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Wide support for the U.S. action, as well as the fact that the action was
given firm footing by Security Council resolutions, led many to believe
that the U.N. Charter regime on the use of force was visibly enrolled in
change.236 Military action in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September
11 attacks drew favorable responses to the use of force-the U.S. right
of self-defense often being mentioned in the same breath as the terrorist
attacks.237
On September 12, 2002, about six months after routing Al Qaeda
fighters and toppling the Taliban from power, President Bush challenged
the United Nations to address the threat posed by Iraq as highlighted by
its continuing defiance of the Security Council. 238 The war against Iraq
was to be the defining moment in the evolution of the "Bush Doctrine,"
marking a growing coherence and confidence in the strategy of "offensive
defense."
b. Old Solutions for New Problems: Pre-Emptive Strikes
Customary international law has long recognized that no requirement
exists for states to "absorb the first hit." The doctrine of anticipatory or
pre-emptive self-defense, as developed historically, is applicable only
when there is a clear and imminent danger of attack. The means used
for pre-emptive response must be strictly limited to those required for
the elimination of the danger and must be reasonably proportional to that
objective.
The U.N. Charter seems to expressly preclude the concept of a pre-
emptive strike. Under the Charter, self-defense can only be in response
to an armed attack, not a threatened attack. A significant number of
scholars argue that the U.N. Charter precludes any right of anticipatory
self-defense.239 This argument relies on a restrictive reading of Article
51 of the U.N. Charter which permits the use of force in the event that
"an armed attack occurs.' '240 These writers assert that this language, at
least by implication, precludes the use of force in anticipation of an
People, supra note 220.
236. Frederic L. Kirgis, The American Society of International Law (ASIL) Insights:
Israel's Intensified Military Campaign against Terrorism, Dec. 10, 2001, at http://www.
asil.org/insights/insigh78.htm (last visited May 20, 2004).
237. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 226; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 228.
238. President's Address to U.N. General Assembly, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1529 (Sept. 12, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/
09/20020912-1 .html (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
239. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION, AND SELF-DEFENSE 184-187
(2nd ed. 1994); RICHARD ERICKSON, LEGITIMATE USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST
STATE-SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 136-38 (1989).
240. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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attack or other event triggering the right of self-defense.241
The basis for the restrictive argument is that, once recognized, a right
to anticipatory self-defense is potentially very difficult to define or limit,
and bad faith or an error in judgment could easily lead to unnecessary
conflict.242 It is contended that the right to respond with force in self-
defense, even to a triggering act that has already occurred, is temporally
limited. As the Caroline incident 243 indicates, the customary right of
self-defense appears to require immediate action.244 Otherwise, there is
a strong argument that the use of force is nothing more than a reprisal,
which, while permitted under limited circumstances by customary
international law, is widely agreed to have been outlawed by the U.N.
Charter.
i. Weapons of Mass Destruction: A New Calculus in
Preemptive Action
Some scholars believe that a right of truly anticipatory self-defense
has emerged outside of Article 51 in light of the availability of weapons
of mass destruction.245 Professor Thomas Franck accounts for the
emergence of a viable doctrine of anticipatory self-defense through "the
transformation of weaponry to instruments of overwhelming and instant
destruction. These [weapons bring] into question the conditionality of
Article 51, which limits states' exercise of the right of self-defense to the
aftermath of an armed attack. Inevitably, first-strike capabilities begat a
doctrine of 'anticipatory self-defense.' '247 Professor Christopher Greenwood
weighs in with the observation that in a nuclear age, it is the potentially
devastating consequences of prohibiting self-defense, unless an armed
241. Even if one does not limit the right of self-defense to "armed attacks," the
language of Article 51 of the United Nations Charter still reasonably suggests that a
triggering event must actually have occurred, not merely be anticipated.
242. Baker, supra note 12, at 33.
243. Where it is understood as "anticipatory self-defense," the customary right to
pre-empt has its modem origins in the Caroline incident, which established that the
serious threat of armed attack may justify militarily defensive action. See supra text
accompanying note 205.
244. MOORE, supra note 176, at 409-14.
245. BOwErr, supra note 110, at 191-92; see also ERICKSON, supra note 239, at
142-43.
247. Thomas M. Franck, When, if Ever, May States Deploy Military Force without
Prior Security Council Authorization?, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 51, 57-58 (2001).
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attack has already occurred, that leads one to prefer the interpretation
permitting anticipatory self-defense. He argues further:
... this view accords better with State practice and with the realities of modem
military conditions than with the more restrictive interpretation of Article 51,
which would confine the right of self-defense to cases in which an armed attack
had already occurred-although it has to be said that, as a matter of simple
construction of the words alone, another conclusion might be reached. 248
The positions by Franck and Greenwood are supported by Professor
Michael Glennon, who eloquently lays out five factual contemporary
realities that the U.N. Charter drafters did not have the benefit of more
than half a century ago when drafting the document.249
The arguments by these scholars are particularly strong when one
considers that shortly after the birth of the U.N. Charter, the Atomic
Energy Commission suggested in its First Report in December 1946 that
preparation for atomic warfare in breach of a multilateral treaty or
convention would, in view of the appalling power of the weapon, have to
be treated as an "armed attack" within Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.25 °
248. Greenwood, supra note 210, at 15.
249. Professor Michael Glennon begins by noting that 21st century security needs
are different from those imagined at the founding of the United Nations and then sets out
the following five factual realties:
1. [Tjhe intended safeguard against unlawful threats of force-a vigilant and
muscular Security Council-never materialized. ...
2. [M]odem methods of intelligence collection, such as satellite imagery and
communications intercepts, now make it unnecessary to sit out an actual armed
attack to await convincing proof of a state's hostile intent.
3. [W]ith the advent of weapons of mass destruction and their availability to
international terrorists, the first blow can be devastating-far more devastating
than the pinprick attacks on which the old rules were premised.
4. [T]errorist organizations "of global reach" were unknown when Article 51
was drafted. [They have however flourished owing to large "war chests"
facilitating] develop[ment] and stockpil[ing of] weaponry[, acquisition of state
of the art] communications equipment [and safe training] camps.... All this
requires a sanctuary, which only states can provide-and which only states can
take away.
5. [T]he danger of catalytic war erupting from the use of preemptive force has
lessened [considerably] with the end of the Cold War. . . [thus] mak[ing] less
sense today, when safe-haven states and terrorist organizations are not
themselves possessed of preemptive capabilities.
Michael J. Glennon, Preempting Terrorism; The Case for Anticipatory Self-Defense,
WEEKLY STANDARD, Jan. 28, 2002, at 24, 26.
250. See generally Claud H. M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by
Individual States in International Law, in 2 REcUEIL DES COURS [ANTHOLOGY OF THE
COURSES] 451, 498 (1952) (recounting the Atomic Energy Commission's suggestions to
the U.N. Security Council).
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More specifically, the AEC made the following recommendations to the
Security Council about the control of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons: "The
development and use of atomic energy are not essentially matters of domestic
concern of the individual nations, but rather have predominantly international
implications and repercussions.
'" 251
The impact of WMDs on the modem self-defense doctrine appears to
be the basis on which some commentators have concluded that a
doctrine permitting certain anticipatory self-defense actions is available
for states to utilize. Truly anticipatory self-defense would permit the use
of force "[i]f a state has developed the capability of inflicting substantial
harm upon another, indicated explicitly or implicitly its willingness or
intent to do so, and to all appearances is waiting only for the opportunity
to strike. 253
It cannot be supposed that the inviolability of territory is so sacrosanct
as to mean that a state may harbor within its territory the most blatant
preparation for an assault upon another state's independence with
impunity; the inviolability of territory is subject to the use of that
territory in a manner which does not involve a threat to the rights of
other states.254 Supporting this position further is the argument that there
is no requirement under the literal letter of Article 51 that a foreign
government itself directly undertake the attack to which a state responds.
ii. Operation "Iraqi Freedom"
Even as the United States moved against Afghanistan, the highest
levels of military, legal, and diplomatic policymakers in Washington
began debating how the United States should confront states that sponsor
terrorism and proliferate WMDs. The immediate focus of that debate
centered on U.S. policy towards Iraq. The magnitude of the September
11 attacks had altered the equation dramatically. The possibility of
collusion between a rogue, troublesome nation with potential access to
WMDs and terrorists was sufficient to send pulses racing in Washington.
Based on the general support and cooperation that the United States
251. Leo Van Den Hole, Anticipatory Self-Defense Under International Law, 19
AM. U. INT'L L.R. 69, 91(2003).
252. ERICKSON, supra note 239, at 149 ("[A]nticipatory self-defense can be a legal
justification for the use of armed force").
253. See Michael Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence
in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J. LAW & PUB. POL'Y. 539, 552 (2002).
254. BOWETr, supra note ll0, at 141,191-92.
received in the military campaign against the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan, the United States began to capitalize on this goodwill.
It argued that it was legally justified in exercising a right of anticipatory
self-defense by attacking hostile "rogue" states and states that harbor
terrorists.25 5  No longer was terrorism merely a sporadic series of
pinpricks, but in view of the possibility of WMDs ending up in the
hands of terrorists from rogue states, terrorism could inflict catastrophic
destruction 256 and thus posed a threat to the security and survival of the
United States-such stance is strongly captured in the National Security
Strategy document released about five months before the Iraqi
invasion.25 7 The United States saw the use of military action to remove
the threat of chemical, biological, and nuclear proliferation in Iraq as a
strategic imperative, arguing rather strongly that the risk of inaction in
the face of such a threat is intolerable.
The military action in Iraq following the "Axis of Evil" speech by
President Bush provoked strong opposition given its definite overtones
of unilateral military action by the United States against countries that
support terror.258 This was in spite of U.S. insistence that the act was a
strategic imperative in its strategy of "offensive defense. 259 Unlike Al
Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, however, Iraq did not bear
responsibility for a recent terrorist attack against the united States.260
The absence of such an attack limited the application of any new rule of
international law to Iraq.
The decision to attack was done over the loud objections of a skeptical
international community that doubted the existence of the WMDs and
many international scholars who were worried by the effect of failure by
the United States to secure a Security Council mandate. Military action
255. No doubt the U.N. Charter is not a suicide pact. In any case, the International
Court of Justice considered this proposition in its Advisory Opinion on the Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 296 (July 8), wherein it noted
that it would not lose sight of the fundamental right of every state to survival, and thus its
right to resort to self-defense, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter, when
survival is at stake.
256. See President's Address to the U.N. General Assembly, supra note 238 ("[I]f
an emboldened regime were to supply [weapons of mass destruction] to terrorist allies,
then the attacks of September 11 th would be a prelude to far greater horrors").
257. "For centuries, international law recognized that nations need not suffer an
attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against forces that
present an imminent danger of attack." George W. Bush, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15-16 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/nsc/nss.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2005).
258. President's State of the Union Address, (Jan. 29, 2002), available at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11 .html (last visited Feb. 21, 2005).
259. Id.
260. KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE THREATENING STORM: THE CASE FOR INvADING
IRAQ 157 (2002).
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against Iraq, not surprisingly, split the international community and
inflamed the world's major powers since it raises debate both as a matter
of policy and legality. Considering that the use of armed force can only
be justified under international law when used in self-defense, can the
United States go beyond the rhetoric and actually carry the "War on
Terror" to those rogue nations who are identified as supporters and
sponsors of terrorist activities, but have not actually physically engaged
in an act of aggression against the U.S.?
261
The convergence of international terrorism and weapons of mass
destruction presents a grave threat to international peace, security, and
prosperity and indeed to the very survival of nations. What is disturbing
about the U.S. stance is the fact that anticipatory self-defense is being
touted as an appropriate vehicle in the war against international terrorism
even though Article 51's "armed attack" requirement supercedes any
pre-existing right of anticipatory action.
Overall, the "Bush Doctrine" of preventive self-defense threatens to
upset the international regime on the use of force. In any case, whatever
legal and political capital that the United States and its military campaign
fuelled in the run up to "Operation Enduring Freedom" was effectively
squandered away in the rash and ill-advised "Operation 
Iraqi Freedom."2 62
If the "Bush Doctrine" forms the basis of new state practice, the existing
system would be transformed from its tenuous law-based framework to a
balance-of-power system. 263 Once the door to pre-emptive strikes is
open, it can hardly be closed again; and any nation in the world will be
able to take advantage of this option.
V. CONCLUSION
The September 11 terrorist attacks reinforced the proposition that the
U.N. Charter system is ill-equipped to deal with contemporary security
threats, with its emphasis on a law enforcement paradigm whose success
relies ultimately on the cooperation of states. It is a reality that criminal
prosecutions are generally ineffective in deterring fundamentalist
terrorist groups able to recruit individuals as prepared for sacrifice as
good soldiers. A purely law enforcement approach cannot be expected
261. Addicott, supra note 28.
262. Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto, Rushing to Break the Law? The Bush Doctrine of
Pre-Emptive Strikes and the U.N. Charter on the Use of Force, 7 U. W. SYDNEY L.R. 1,
14 (2003).
263. Id. at 34.
to deal with this threat nor shut down terrorist organizations operating in
hostile and uncooperative states.
After September 11, states simply may believe, more than before, that
they are justified in acting outside the U.N. system.
A collective, institutional response to terrorism may be more effective than ad
hoc unilateralism or narrow coalition building. It may be difficult to prevent ad
hoc unilateralism from devolving into self-interested opportunism. Who defines
what an armed attack is? A "threat to the peace"? Who defines when, where,
how, and why the use of force can be initiated to contain (or punish) rogue
states? If the US can use extensive military force to respond to terrorism, there
is no principled basis to deny others that entitlement.264
Despite the horror of September 11, an unbridled use of military force
is too all-encompassing to conform to even an expansive reading of the
U.N. Charter. The current climate dictates the need to realign the existing
rules on the use of force to match the altered international security
environment. Measures from another era that simply impose a limit on
the use of force that frustrates a nation's ability to defend itself will
result in the United Nations being marginalized as states fall back on the
expansive right of self-preservation and inevitably place their own
survival above adherence to an international law system that cannot
guarantee their security and the safety of their citizens. The restrictive
international regime on the use of force will remain relevant only if the
international community explores and develops new avenues for dealing
with the threat of international terrorism.
264. Mark Drumbl, Victimhood in Our Neighborhood: Terrorist Crime, Taliban
Guilt, and the Asymmetries of the International Legal Order, 81 N.C. L. REv. 1, 32-33
(2002).
